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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(j).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC,
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or statutes for the issues
presented by any party to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Statement of Issues on Cross Appeal is set forth at page 44 below.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION BELOW.
This action involves the interpretation of an Easement and Use Agreement
("Agreement", Tr. Ex. 1) entered into in 1985 as a settlement agreement between Frank
Gillmor and David K. Richards & Co. The Agreement addressed the use of mountain
roads on property owned by David K. Richards & Co. in Summit County. The current
dispute was tried to the District Court in Summit County, the Honorable Robert K.
Hilder, over six days in March of 2002. Judge Hilder entered his findings of fact and
conclusions of law in May 2002 (R. 1711) and the Judgment on September 24, 2002.
(R. 1781.) Rule 59 Motions to Alter or Amend the Judgment were filed on October 8,
2002 and on October 9, 2002 (R. 1790, 1808), and the Order on those motions was
entered on April 1, 2003. (R. 1974.) Nadine Gillmor's Notice of Appeal was filed on
April 25, 2003. David K. Richards & Co., Robin Macey, Ken Macey and Family Link,

L.L.C. filed Notices of Cross Appeal on April 30, 2003. (R. 1980, 1983.) The appeal
and cross appeal are from a final judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Parties
The plaintiff, Nadine Gillmor ("Gillmor"), is the successor in interest to Frank
Gillmor. Prior to his death in 1995, Frank Gillmor owned land in the upper Weber
Canyon in Summit County. For many years the Gillmor family used the land as summer
range for sheep and cattle. (R. 2014, p. 164-65, 170.) Frank Gillmor was one of the
parties to the Agreement.
The defendant David K. Richards & Co. ("Richards") owned property adjoining
Frank Gillmor5 s. Richards is the other party to the Agreement and still owns a portion of
the property over which the disputed easements run. The balance of the Richards' parcel
is now owned by Family Link, L.L.C. ("Family Link"), a family entity owned by Ken
and Robin Macey. Tr. Ex. 338, 339 (R. 2011, p. 867).
The 1984-1985 Litigation
The Agreement was reached to settle litigation commenced in 1984 by Frank
Gillmor. (R. 2014, p. 147.) The suit was filed when Richards challenged the right of
people hunting on the Gillmor property to use livestock trails called the Perdue Creek
road and the Neil Creek road that run from the Weber Canyon highway across Richards'
property up to the Gillmor property. (R. 2011, p. 882-883.) In his lawsuit Frank Gillmor
claimed a prescriptive easement over the roads. (Complaint, Tr. Ex. 4, R. 2014, p. 194.)
The Perdue Creek road is the focus of this action and appeal.
2

The Agreement was negotiated by attorneys representing Frank Gillmor and
Richards. James Elegante represented Gillmor and was the primary drafter of the
Agreement. (R. 2014, p. 197.) The parties began negotiating a settlement in earnest
shortly before trial was scheduled to begin on November 21, 1985. Several drafts of the
Agreement were exchanged over the weeks leading to trial. (R. 2014, p. 204-205.) Both
counsel who participated in the drafting of the Agreement testified at trial, Elegante in
person and Richards' attorney, H. Ross Workman, by deposition. David K. Richards, the
principal of David K. Richards & Co., also testified at trial. (R. 2011, p. 857.)
Frank Gillmor understood during the 1985 negotiations that he was giving up
some of the rights he claimed in his suit in order to have some assured access. (R. 2014,
p. 194.)
Frank Gillmor died prior to the time this action was filed. Nadine Gillmor, who
married Frank in November of 1984, testified at trial. Although Nadine Gillmor claimed
to have participated in the direction and prosecution of the 1984 lawsuit, Frank Gillmor's
attorney, James Elegante, testified that Nadine was not generally with Frank when he and
Frank discussed the lawsuit. (R. 2014, p. 189.) During arguments on the motions to alter
or amend the judgment, the trial judge observed:
. , . And I have great respect for Mrs. Gillmor, but she also made statements
regarding her involvement in many meetings and negotiations, which I do
not find to be credible based on the evidence, and I have some issues about
credibility on her - - the extent of her involvement. So that doesn't carry a
lot of weight with me in all candor."
(R. 2007, p. 12.)

3

The Parties Conduct After Settlement
After the 1984 litigation was settled and prior to Frank's death in 1995, there was
little disagreement between the Gillmors and Richards relating to the use of the roads.
During this time, Frank leased his property initially to his cousin, Steve Gillmor, and then
to his nephew, Luke Gillmor, for use as summer pasture. (R. 2012, p. 526.)
At the time the Agreement was reached, Frank Gillmor had an arrangement with
Vern Howard and his sons Tom and Craig and a number of their friends (the "Howard
group") to put up the fences on his property in the spring and lay down them down in the
fall and to do other work on the property related to animal husbandry. In exchange,
Frank gave the Howard group the right to hunt on the Gillmor property during deer
hunting season. (R. 2012, p. 556.) At the time of the 1984 litigation there was no
structure on the Gillmor property other than a hunting shack used by the Howard group.
The shack did not have running water, electricity or a heating system and was not suitable
for any type of long-term use. (R. 2014, p. 152.)
Prior to 1981, the hunting shack had been located on a different part of the
property belonging to Frank Gillmor's father and uncle and was accessed by a different
road, the White's Creek road. (R. 2012, p. 550,1. 23-25.) The White's Creek road is one
of several roads, other than the roads at issue here, that lead into the Gillmor property.
(R. 2012, p. 552; 2011, p. 728-730.) After the larger block of property was partitioned
(Tr.Ex. 2) between Frank and his relatives, Frank asked the Howards to move the shack.
(R. 2012, p. 554.)

4

Before the Agreement was signed, on occasion two-wheel motorcycles and a three
wheel All Terrain Vehicle ("ATV") had been used on the Perdue and Neil Creek roads by
people going to the Gillmor property, and the noise and dust these created were a
principal concern of Dave Richards in the 1985 negotiation. (Workman Depo., p. 32-34.)
Tom Howard bought and used his first four wheel ATV in the Spring of 1985 and Vern
and Craig, each bought their first four wheel ATV in October, 1985, about one month
before the Agreement was signed. (R. 2012, p. 564.)
After the Agreement was signed, Frank instructed the Howards that they were not
to use their ATVs or motorcycles on the Perdue Creek road. He told them that as part of
the settlement, they would have to trailer their four-wheel ATVs over Richards' road up
to the Gillmor property. (R. 2012, p. 561.)
In the early 1990's Frank Gillmor became dissatisfied with the work of the
Howard group and told the Howards that he was going to make other arrangements for
putting up and letting down the fences on his property. (R. 2012, p. 572-573.) Around
that time he began using Jed Wilde and Lou Stevens and their families to take care of the
fences. In exchange, like the Howard group, they were allowed to hunt on the property.
(R. 2012, p. 572; R. 2011, p. 676-677.)
Events Leading To This Litigation
Frank Gillmor died in January 1995. Prior to Frank's death, the Gillmors did not
own or use any three or four-wheel ATVs on the Perdue Creek road. (R. 2011, p. 738739.) In 1996, Nadine Gillmor's daughter, son-in-law and grandchildren moved back to
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Utah after having lived out of the state for a number of years. They began to use four
wheel ATVs on the Perdue Creek road. (R. 2011, p. 639.)
Richards sold part of his property to Barry Miller who in 1999 sold a part of the
property to the Maceys. (Tr. Ex. 338 and 339.) The Maceys began building a summer
house near the Perdue Creek road in 2000. (R. 2015, p. 1199.) In the fall of 2000, Ken
Macey saw Nadine Gillmor's son-in-law driving an ATV on Perdue Creek road and told
him that ATVs should not be driven on the road but should be trailered up to the Gillmor
property. (R. 2015, p. 1158) Over the Memorial Day weekend of 2001, the Maceys
stopped several of Nadine Gillmor's grandchildren and their friends, on a total of eight
ATVs, on the road and told them they should trailer the ATVs up to the Gillmor property.
In response, Nadine Gillmor commenced this action. (R. 2015, p. 1159.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION
TO GILLMOR'S CLAIMS OF ERROR
Nadine Gillmor's opening Brief sets up a house of cards and spends 30 pages
destroying it. This case does not involve a general grant of access, so Gillmor's lengthy
treatise on the history and attributes of such grants is of little assistance to the Court.
This case concerns a seven page written Agreement, negotiated through numerous drafts
by parties represented by counsel. The Agreement grants specific easements for limited
purposes, and declares:
The Easements herein granted are granted for the following purposes only
and shall not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of
Richards. (Para. 3, Tr. Ex. 1)
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Rather than address the entire Agreement between Richards and Frank Gillmor, Nadine
Gillmor's brief focuses on a single phrase from one of the granting paragraphs, and
asserts that phrase overrides all of the other language in the Agreement and governs the
entire relationship between the parties.
In light of the limited grants of use given to Frank Gillmor in the Agreement, the
limitations on Gillmor determined by the trial court are correct. Four-wheel ATVs were
properly barred from use on the easements, and the trial court's decision was supported
by evidence of the parties' intent. Gillmor failed to marshall the evidence in making her
attack on certain findings of fact, and the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous.
The trial court's decision addressed matters at issue before it, and its judgment does not
include advisory opinions. The trial court properly denied Gillmor's motion to amend
her complaint, and her motion for summary judgment.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO GILLMOR'S CLAIMS OF ERROR
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO
INTERPRET THE AGREEMENT, AND GILLMOR'S CLAIMS OF
ERROR FAIL.
Gillmor's claims of error ignore the written language of the Agreement as well as

the contracting parties' intentions in entering into the Agreement. At the heart of all of
Gillmor's claims of error is her mistaken belief that she is entitled to unfettered rights to
use the Perdue Creek road. This elaborate house of cards - that the trial court granted her
"unfettered" and "unlimited" rights of access across Richards' and Maceys' property but
then saddled her with unwarranted limitations - and the many pages of argument and

7

case law dedicated to support the claim and attack the limitations, ignores the structure,
language and intent of the Agreement.
In interpreting the Agreement, the trial court was guided by several key principles
of contract interpretation. First, contract interpretation requires analyzing the entire
contract, giving effect to every term. See Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, If 19, 994 P.2d
193 (Utah 2000) ("[W]e interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable
expectations of the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances,
nature, and purpose of the contract."). Second, a court interpreting an easement may not
grant license to use the easement outside the limitations actually set forth in the grant
itself. Labrum v. Rickenbach, 711 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah 1985). Finally, the whole point
of interpreting the contract is to give effect to the parties' intentions, purposes and
reasonable expectations in entering into the agreement. SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson,
2001 UT 54,114, 28 P.3d 669, 675 (Utah 2001) (the parties intentions are "controlling");
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah App.
1987) (court must consider agreement's purpose in interpreting its terms); Nixon and
Nixon, Inc. v. John New & Assoc, Inc., 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982) (contracts to be
construed in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties as evidenced by the
purpose and language of the contract). With these principles in mind, Gillmor's claims of
error fall.
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A.

The Trial Court Properly Gave Meaning to AH the Terms of the
Agreement in its Interpretation.

Getting the cart before the horse, the bulk of Gillmor's arguments rest on the
fallacious assumption that one clause in paragraph 3 (a), granting Frank Gillmor and
certain specific family members rights of "vehicular access," now gives Nadine Gillmor
complete, unfettered and unlimited rights of access over the Perdue Creek road. In
evaluating Gillmor's points of error, the Court must consider the structure, language, and
purpose of the Agreement in its entirety. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, f 19.
The Agreement's structure is simple and understandable: Paragraph 1 grants the
easements, but only "subject to the conditions and limitations herein contained."
Paragraph 2 describes the recipients of the easements and limits the use of the easements
to prevent rights of public access. Paragraph 3 describes certain specific purposes that
define and circumscribe how the easements may be used and makes clear that those uses
may not be enlarged:
The Easements herein are granted for the following purposes only and shall
not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of Richards.
Paragraph 3 also contains four subparts setting forth permitted uses. Subpart (a)
grants "vehicular access (ingress and egress)" along Perdue Creek road for three
purposes: 1) "maintenance work performed on the Gillmor Property"; 2) "by Gillmor and
his immediate family to the first degree of consanguinity, and their spouses and
1

In Elegante's first draft of the Agreement, he included at the end of this limiting
sentence the additional language, "which shall not be unreasonably withheld." At
Richards' insistence, the parties struck the additional language, further emphasizing that
the easements granted were for limited purposes only. Tr. Ex. 304, 309, 310.
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children," and 3) "animal husbandry." Subpart (b) grants "general access for animal
husbandry, including the herding of livestock...." Subpart (c) grants "vehicular access"
along Perdue Creek road to Gillmor's invitees, "limited to access for maintenance work
performed on the Gillmor Property. . . and for hunting." Subpart (d) grants vehicular and
general access across the Neil Creek road "for use in emergency situations only or with
the permission of Richards."
Paragraph 4 states that the covenants within the Agreement run with the land.
Paragraph 5 sets forth maintenance obligations of the parties. Finally, paragraph 6
establishes further limitations on access for hunting and the kinds of vehicles that can be
used on the easements.
Gillmor argues that the Agreement's reference in paragraph 3(a) to "vehicular
access (ingress and egress)" converts the easement into an "unfettered" right of access.
This is wishful thinking. Instead, paragraph 3(a) allows access for three purposes only:
maintenance work, access by Frank Gillmor (and certain family members) and animal
husbandry. The parties to the Agreement took great care to limit the rights of use
provided under paragraph 3(a). (R. 2014, p. 195; p. 226.) If a particular use does not fall
into the categories set forth in 3(a), or other categories set forth in the remaining subparts
of paragraph 3, then it is expressly not permitted, as the prefatory language of paragraph
3 makes clear: "for the following purposes only."

The issue of whether Nadine Gillmor and her children have rights of access
pursuant to paragraph 3(a) was incorrectly decided by the trial court. This issue is
addressed below at page 47 in Section I of the arguments on cross appeal.
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Nowhere is Gillmor's misinterpretation of the Agreement clearer than in her
argument that her personal right of access includes a right to have invitees use the
easement. Her argument is flatly inconsistent with paragraph 3(c) where the question of
invitees is addressed directly. That subpart grants vehicular access to the Gillmor
property "for Gillmor's invitees," but says, "such access is hereby limited to access for
maintenance work . . . and for hunting." (Tr. Ex. 1.)
Finally, the purposes set forth in paragraph 3 remain subject to other restrictions
set forth in the Agreement, including the restrictions on the number of hunting invitees,
the number of vehicles and the exclusion of all terrain vehicles in paragraph 6. If
Gillmor's rights under the Agreement were unfettered rights of ingress and egress, then
the Agreement, as well as its particularized purposes and limitations, would be
superfluous. See Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ^f 21 (court should give an interpretation which
gives an effective meaning to all the terms over an interpretation which leaves a part with
no effect). The trial court correctly applied principles of contract interpretation in
refusing to declare that Gillmor's rights under the Agreement were unfettered or
unlimited.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Refused to Permit Any Use Not Granted by
the Agreement.

Gillmor's house of cards also rests on the erroneous assertion that her rights
extend to any use not specifically prohibited by the Agreement. This is clearly incorrect.
The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "[a] right of way founded on a deed or
grant is limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument." Labrum, 711 P.2d at 227;
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see also Wycoffv. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 1982); accord Kikta v. Hughes, 766
P.2d 321, 323 (N.M. App. 1988) (owner of dominant estate "cannot change the extent of
the easement or subject the servient estate to an additional burden not contemplated by
the grant of easement. .."); Steil v. Smith, 901 P.2d 395, 396 (Wyo. 1995) (where an
easement is claimed under a grant, the extent of the right depends on its terms). Thus, the
only permitted uses of the easement are those actually set forth in the Agreement.
Gillmor is not entitled to general rights of ingress and egress because the
Agreement itself limits the purposes, users and manner of using the easement. Thus, all
of the cases cited by Gillmor in support of her claim of an unfettered right of access are
irrelevant because either they discuss grants of access that were unlimited by their terms
or they recognize the principle that the grant itself may limit the holder's rights. See
Shingleton v. North Carolina, 133 S.E.2d 183, 184-187 (N.C. 1963) (discussing an
unlimited conveyance); Davis v. Jefferson Cty. Tele. Co., 95 S.E. 1042, 1044 (W.Va.
1918) (discussing right of way granted "without limit of use"); River City Resort, Inc. v.
Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., No. E1999-02567-CO4-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1, at
*5 (Tenn. App. Jan. 3, 2001) (discussing lack of "limitation" in conveyance), cert,
denied, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 448 (Tenn. May 21, 2001); Bowers v. Myers, 85 A. 860, 861
(Pa. 1912) (discussing grant expressed in "general terms"); Chevy Chase Land Co. v.
United States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1074 (Md. App. 1999) ("The language of the easement can
grant to the easement holder a good deal of discretion in the use of the easement or limit
the use very narrowly . . .".) (emphasis added.).
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Gillmor argues that the only limitation upon her use is the common law legal
principle that the user of an easement cannot create or increase the burden on the land.
She then claims that because the trial court made no finding of increased burden, there
should be no limitations. Gillmor Brief at 32. This argument fails. Analyzing whether
any particular use creates an additional burden is the second part of the analysis; the
primary part is an analysis of the limitations contained in the grant. Any use that violates
the limitations set forth in the Agreement would, by definition, constitute an increase in
the burden on the servient estate. The cases Gillmor cites in support of her proposition
that an increase of burden on the servient estate is the only limitation on use of an
easement, Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998); Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d
431 (Utah 1993); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah
1946), are inapposite because they do not address express easements or grants of limited
rights of use.
The trial court's conclusion that paragraph 3(a)'s grant of vehicular access to
"Frank Gillmor and his immediate family to the first degree of consanguinity, and their
spouses and children" is "unfettered by any restriction as to the purpose of the access,"
(R. 1721) does not magically extinguish all of the restrictions in the Agreement.
Although Frank Gillmor may have been able to use the Perdue Creek road personally to
get to his property and do anything he wanted to do when he got there, the other
limitations on use of easement remained in place.
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C.

The Trial Court Properly Interpreted the Agreement as a Settlement
Agreement.

In an attempt to avoid the limitations set forth in the Agreement, Gillmor argues
that the Agreement should be construed against Richards as grantor and in Gillmor's
favor. Gillmor Brief at 25. The Agreement at issue here was not a deed; it was a
settlement agreement. (R. 2014, p. 149, p. 151.) It is a general rule that ambiguous
provisions in a settlement agreement should be construed against the drafter of those
provisions. Cherry v. Utah State Univ., 966 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1998) (stating general
rule that ambiguous contracts are construed against the grantor); see Century Fin. Serv.t
Inc. v. Peach Tree Bancard Corp., No. 91-1914, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8993, at *9
(E.D. Pa. June 22, 1992); Sulit v. D. Boothe & Co., Nos. 01-3353/01-3354, 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2362, at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2002). This is the case because settlement
agreements are construed "in the same manner as any contract." Erdman v. Cochise
County, 926 F.2d 877, 880 (9 Cir. 1991). In this case, certain ambiguous provisions
were properly construed against Gillmor because it was Gillmor's attorney that drafted
the provisions. (R. 2014, p. 204-205, 213.)
D.

The Trial Court Did Not Reform the Agreement

In an effort to mischaracterize the trial court's ruling as error, Gillmor asserts the
court engaged in "reformation" or "re-writing" of the Agreement. In considering and
ruling upon the facts presented at trial, and in analyzing those facts in light of the
Agreement, the trial court was not reforming the Agreement. It simply ruled whether, on
the facts presented, Gillmor was entitled to the extensive rights she claimed, even where
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those rights were not found in the Agreement. This was a critical function of the trial
court given the strict instruction of paragraph 3 that the purposes of the easements not be
enlarged without Richards' express consent.
Gillmor seeks to bolster her legal argument by contending that in 1984 Frank
Gillmor was entitled to "unfettered" rights to the Perdue Creek road and that these
unlimited rights of use were carried over to the Agreement. Consideration of the origins
of the Agreement are helpful here. The 1984 litigation arose because Frank Gillmor did
not have any express easement over Richard's property. Gillmor sued claiming a
prescriptive easement based on historical use. (Tr. Ex. 4.) The Agreement was crafted as
a compromise, with Gillmor conceding on a number of issues to obtain some assured
access. (Findings of Fact 14, 15; R. 1713, 1714; which are not challenged by Gillmor.)
Under the Agreement, the manner in which Frank was allowed to use the Perdue
Creek road (e.g., using an ATV), or who or what he took with him (e.g., invitees, large
numbers of hunters, family members other than to the first degree of consanguinity,
construction trucks or supplies, etc.) were limited. The Agreement's specific terms, and
the evidence at trial made plain that Richards was willing to allow, and Frank Gillmor
was willing to accept (R. 2014, p. 225, - p. 226), limited use of the Perdue Creek road,
and that the easements were granted for certain, circumscribed purposes.
II.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT CHALLENGED BY GILLMOR ARE
CORRECT,
Nadine Gillmor challenges six findings of fact made by the trial court. A trial

court's finding of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Young v. Young,
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1999 UT 38, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999); U.R.C.P. Rule 52(a) ("findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses."). The party challenging a finding of fact must show that the
material findings are clearly erroneous by marshaling all evidence supporting the
findings, then showing this evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings when
viewed in a light most favorable to a trial court's findings. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
935-36 (Utah 1994). A trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if they are
so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence.
The marshaling requirement serves the important function of reminding litigants in
appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial. Woodward v.
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). "After constructing this magnificent array
of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv.
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991); see also ELM, Inc. v. M.V. Enterprises, Inc.,
968 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah App. 1998) cert, denied, 982 P.2d 89 (Utah 1999). If an
appellant fails to marshal the evidence properly, appellate courts must assume the
findings are correct. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312.
Findings No. 3 and 4: Gillmor failed to marshal the following evidence which
also supports Finding No. 3. David Richards testified that he personally observed and
discussed with Bertagnole his operation on the mountain. (R. 2011, p. 867.) Richards
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actually leased ground to Bertagnole, saw and discussed Bertagnole's operation with him,
and based on Richards' observations, Bertagnole usually brought his sheep in through
White's Creek (a different road than those at issue here). (R. 2011, p. 867.) Richards
testified that Bertagnole leased ground from him to run sheep and that continued until
about 1995 or 1996, when Bertagnole sold that band of sheep. (R. 2011, p. 873.) Doc
Woolstenhulme also testified that in the mid-1980fs, the Bertagnoles were running sheep
on the Gillmor property. (R. 2012, p. 383, 384, 386.)
Gillmor did not marshal any evidence, either in support of or contradicting
Finding No. 4. Finding No. 4 is explicit in that it reflects what Richards was aware of at
the time he purchased the property. This Finding, so far as what Sheilds had allowed
Frank Gillmor to do, is directed to Richards' understanding as opposed to the truth of the
matter and was never challenged by Gillmor. The second to the last sentence in the
finding is based upon what Richards actually saw and is supported by Richards'
testimony. R. 2011, p. 873, 874, 877. The last sentence in Finding No. 4 refers to
Richards' belief, which was not subject to the objection, and is also supported by the
testimony of Tom Howard who talked about accessing the Gillmor property by the
White's Creek road (which begins lower in the canyon and does not cross Richards'
property) (R. 2012, p. 548-550, 553). Tom Howard also testified about accessing the
Gillmor property from the Chalk Creek or the north side of the Gillmor parcel. (R. 2012,
p. 601.) Dave Richards knew when the Agreement was being negotiated that Gillmor
had other access to his property. (R. 2008, p. 951.)

17

Finding No. 18: Gillmor's discussion of the evidence contradicting Finding No.
18 begins with the assertion that "there is an utter absence of evidence" of the parties
intent to preclude Gillmor from transporting materials to construct a new cabin on his
property. (Gillmor Brief, p. 12) This assertion is incorrect. Trial Exhibit 304 was a
November 1, 1985 draft of the Agreement prepared by Frank Gillmor's counsel, James
Elegante. That draft contained language in paragraph 2 that provided:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is acknowledged by
Richards that one residence may be constructed upon the
Gillmor Property, and that the occupant of such residence
shall have the right to use the easement for access to such
residence.
Trial Exhibits 307 and 310, later drafts of the Agreement dated November 15, 1985 and
November 20, 1985, again drafted by James Elegante, continue this provision. (R. 2014,
p. 211, 213, 219.)
Trial Exhibit 332 is Ross Workman's marked up copy of Elegante's November
15th draft. Workman and Elegante discussed these changes. (R. 2014, p. 210.) In the
final draft of the Agreement, the language authorizing Gillmor to use the Perdue Creek
road to construct the cabin was removed.
The deletion of language in drafts of an agreement is a significant indication of the
intention of the parties. In Golden Pacific Bancorp v. FDIC, 273 F.3d 509, 517 (2nd Cir.
2001), the court stated that the rejection of draft language demonstrates the parties'
intentions as to their rights under a final agreement. In Butler Produce & Canning Co. v.
Edgerton State Bank Co., 112 N.E.2d 23, 26 (Ohio 1953), the court held that for purposes
of explaining ambiguous language in a written contract, a preliminary draft of that
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contract, which was rejected by the parties, is admissible in evidence and may be
considered on the question of intent. See also Valley v. Valley, 199 A.2d 93, 94 (N.H.
1964).
Gillmor argues, based on Elegante's testimony (R. 2015, p. 1071), that there was
no negotiation to restrict Frank's right to use Perdue Creek road to construct a new cabin
on his property. In fact, what Elegante said was that that there was no verbal discussion
between counsel for Richards and Frank Gillmor about building another cabin. (R. 2014,
p. 217.) However, Ross Workman, Richards' counsel, specifically recalled a
conversation about paragraph 2 at the courthouse when the Agreement was signed, in the
presence of Frank Gillmor, where Frank Gillmor acknowledged that there was no
residence on his property, and ". . . if my recollection serves me right, residence came out
and cabin went in" (Workman Depo. p. 23).
Thus, both the testimony of Richards' attorney and the history of the drafting of
the Agreement reflect negotiations about using the road to rebuild the cabin. It is clear
that Richards refused to consent to Gillmor's use of the road for this purpose.
The issue of the use of the road for construction was also the subject of one of
Gillmor's post-trial motions. (R. 1812, at 1819.) In prefacing his remarks in ruling upon
those motions, the trial court made the following observation:
And perhaps here I should make an observation I should have
made earlier, and that is, it does not seem to me that Ms.
Gillmor's motion to a large extent does not accept that this
was about compromise, it does not accept it was about limited
use. That was really what was at issue here.
(R. 2007, p. 20,1.23.)
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Gillmor's argument against the finding suggests the grant in paragraph 3(a) to
Frank and his immediate family opens the door to any imaginable use. In effect, Gillmor
argues that the insertion of the personal right of access in paragraph 3(a) provided a
stealth card which undercut all of the negotiations leading up to and the provisions of the
final Agreement. Elegante, the drafter of the provision, never made such a claim. He
testified that the personal right of access was substituted for language in earlier drafts that
granted a right of access for "recreation, which shall include, among other things,
picnicking, camping, hunting and fishing." (R. 2014, p. 230.) Elegante testified that
Frank Gillmor would not give up his rights to recreation. (R. 2014, p. 176.) Frank liked
the new language better because it did not limit the kinds of recreation he and his family
could enjoy. According to Elegante, under the new language "they could fish, they could
pitch horseshoes, they could put up a tent, they could cut a Christmas tree." R. 2014,
p. 230.) Elegante never testified that the right of personal access included a right to use
the easement for construction. In fact, he conceded it was never discussed. (R. 2014,
p. 217.)
The trial court accurately captured the essence of this negotiation in the January 8,
2003 hearing, where he said that Frank and his immediate family could use the easement
as individuals for whatever purpose they wanted. That unfettered grant, however, did not
open the door to all of the uses for which the parties had agreed the road would not be
used. The trial court articulated its rationale as follows (R. 2007, p. 21):
Here the core of the agreement was a compromise, certain
historical uses would be permitted and continued, and that did
not, would not and never could include unfettered access,
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large numbers, destruction of property, uses and access for
construction, creating roads from private to public access. . . .
And I have a huge problem, for example, with the suggestion
that maybe Ms. Gillmor starts driving away lumber trucks
and cement trucks and doing the construction. This was not
intended, this was to be a limited use, and it was to meet some
very important goals, and I think it met them.
Finding No. 23. Gillmor makes no effort to marshal evidence in support of this
finding, instead focusing upon two words in one sentence of the finding. The trial court's
statement that there was "no evidence" addresses solely the issue of Frank Gillmor's and
David Richards' awareness of the use of four-wheelers prior to signing the Agreement.
There are at least three other sentences in the finding which are all supported by
considerable evidence, none of which Gillmor has made any effort to marshal.
In her limited attempt to marshal evidence contradicting the single sentence in
Finding No. 23 about the knowledge of Gillmor and Richards, Gillmor relies extensively
upon letters mailed by Vern Howard to the Gillmors. This same argument was made in
the course of post-trial motions and was addressed by the trial court on January 8, 2003.
(R. 2007.) The letters were referred to in the course of argument, whereat the Court
interrupted Gillmor's counsel and made the following remarks in response to the
argument that Mrs. Gillmor had read these letters to Frank Gillmor (R. 2007, p. 12.):
I think that one particularly, the last point [reading documents
and papers], goes to the issue of credibility. And I have great
respect for Mrs. Gillmor, but she also made statements
regarding her involvement in many meetings and
negotiations, which I do not find to be credible based on the
evidence, and I have some issues about credibility on her the extent of her involvement. So that doesn't carry a lot of
weight with me in all candor.
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The real thrust of this finding is directed to the fact that neither Richards nor
Gillmor consciously distinguished between three and four wheel ATVs. None of the
testimony referred to at page 16 of Gillmor's brief supports the notion that Frank was
aware that four wheelers were being used on the property before the Agreement was
signed. The picture, Exhibit 58, does not have Frank Gillmor in it. There is nothing to
suggest that Frank Gillmor was present when the photograph was taken. Similarly, Tom
Howard's reference to seeing Frank Gillmor up on Perdue Creek road is not in the
context of whether or not Frank saw them on four-wheelers on the property. Contrary to
the conclusion Gillmor attempts to reach, there was no evidence in the record that Frank
Gillmor saw the Howards on four-wheelers on the Perdue Creek road or on the Gillmor
property prior to the time the 1985 Agreement was signed.
What is undisputed is that Elegrante (R. 2014, p. 202), Workman (Depo. p. 33)
and Richards (R. 2008, p. 932) were not aware of four wheelers in 1985. Frank Gillmor
did not discuss them with his attorney or attempt to distinguish them from three wheelers
(R. 2014, p. 204).
Finding No. 26: Gillmor's discussion of evidence contradicting Finding No. 26
actually supports the Finding. Richards and his attorney, Ross Workman, testified that if
they had been aware of four-wheel ATVs, they would have been included in it the
prohibition. (Workman Depo. p. 33.) Elegante testified Frank Gillmor did not
intentionally reserve the right to use four-wheel ATVs on the easement. (R. 2014,
p. 204.)
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Tom Howard's testimony directly supports the trial court's finding. He
specifically testified, on cross-examination, that they did not distinguish their four-wheel
ATVs from three-wheel ATVs, and instead referred to them collectively as "three
wheelers" or as "tracksters." (R. 2012, p. 589.) Tom and Craig Howard's testimony
provided the most telling evidence of Frank Gillmor's intent. Gillmor told the Howards
that they had to trailer their ATVs up to his property and that they could not operate them
on the Perdue Creek road. (R. 2012, pp. 561, 613, 614.)
In addition, both counsel and Richards testified that the provision was drafted to
prohibit highly maneuverable, noisy all-terrain vehicles which created dust and could
easily be driven off the road (Workman Depo. p. 34). Elegante's testimony on this issue
was unequivocal. He agreed that noise and dust were Richards' primary concerns and
that this provision was "very important," in fact "fundamental" for Richards. (R. 2014,
p. 184.)
This evidence convincingly supports the finding reached by the trial court that the
only reason four-wheel ATVs were not expressly prohibited was because they were
relatively new and not consciously distinguished from three-wheel ATVs.
Finding No. 49: Gillmor's attack on Finding No. 49 primarily claims that the trial
court erred when it held that the Gillmor family access rights granted in paragraph 3(a)
did not include the right to allow invitees to use the easement, unless they fit within the
animal husbandry or maintenance uses. Brief at 19-20.
In marshalling the evidence supporting the trial court's interpretation, Gillmor
fails to cite the dispositive language in the Agreement itself. Paragraph 3(c) specifically
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addresses the use of the easement by invitees. It grants a right of "vehicular access
(ingress and egress)...for Gillmor's invitees. Such access is hereby limited to access for
maintenance work performed on the Gillmor property...and for hunting." Tr. Ex. 1. In
light of this clear language concerning the limited bases on which invitees can use the
easement, Gillmor's argument fails.
With respect to Gillmor's claim that the impact of ownership by a corporation or
other entity on the grant of a personal right of access was never discussed, Gillmor fails
to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding. Dave Richards testified that
had Gillmor proposed a grant more general than to Frank and his immediate family, for
example to the owner of the property and his immediate family, Richards would not have
accepted that language because it would potentially permit too many users. (R. 2015,
p. 1086.) This testimony further supports the narrow scope of the personal grant to Frank
Gillmor.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION, BOTH ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND AT TRIAL, THAT GILLMOR IS PRECLUDED FROM
USING FOUR-WHEEL ATVS ON THE EASEMENT IS CORRECT.
The trial court got it right when it ruled that Gillmor may not use four-wheel

ATVs on the easement. Paragraph 6 of the Agreement provides in part:
Gillmor agrees that he will not allow use of and will not himself use any
three-wheel motorized All Terrain Vehicles or any two-wheeled
motorcycles or motorized "dirt bikes" on the Easements at any time.
The trial court found at the conclusion of the trial that:

Elegante agreed that invitees could use the road only for the purposes permitted
in the Agreement. (R. 2014, p. 226.)

">A

25. At the time the Agreement was signed, ATVs were commonly referred
to as "three-wheelers." ATVs may have been referred to by some persons
as "dirt bikes," but there is no persuasive evidence that the term "dirt bikes"
in the Agreement refers to ATVs. In fact, the evidence suggests, albeit not
conclusively, that "dirt bikes" were specifically included to prohibit use of
the noisy and highly maneuverable light motorcycles that Richards found
annoying in the vicinity of his cabin, and that they were prohibited in
addition to three-wheel ATVs.
26. The Court finds that the only reason four-wheel ATVs were not
expressly prohibited is because they were relatively new and they were
unknown to the parties, or at a minimum, they were not consciously
distinguished from "three-wheelers." Both parties, however, intended to
exclude all terrain vehicles that could, because of their maneuverability and
other characteristics, too readily depart from the established roads; and
because, whether on or off the roads, they contributed to the noise and dust
concerns clearly voiced by Richards. (R. 1716)
In attacking the trial court's decisions on this issue, Gillmor has failed to marshal
evidence supportive of the trial court's determinations, either on summary judgment or at
trial. This Court should affirm the trial court on this basis alone.
A,

Summary Judgment Was Properly Denied.

Gillmor attacks the trial court's refusal to grant her partial summary judgment on
the issue of four-wheel ATVs. Summary judgment is appropriate only where "there is no
genuine issue of material fact and. .. the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
As parties against whom summary judgment was sought, Richards, the Maceys
and Family Link were entitled to have all of the facts presented and all the inferences
fairly arising therefrom construed in the light most favorable to them. Winegar v.
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). Whether contract language is ambiguous
is a question of law. Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 987 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1999). An
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ambiguity exists where language is reasonably capable of being understood in more than
one sense. Id., 987 P.2d at 52 (citing R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936
P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997)). Where each party presents tenable conflicting
interpretations of the disputed language, an agreement is ambiguous for purposes of
summary judgment, and extrinsic evidence should be considered by the trier of fact. Id.,
987 P.2d at 54. Moreover, the presence of a dispute as to a single material fact precludes
summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977). Even
where the parties are not in conflict as to certain facts, but the meaning, intention and
consequences of those facts are vigorously disputed, summary judgment is not proper.
Sandbergv. Cline, 576 P.2d 1291, 1292 (Utah 1978).
In response to Gillmor's motion, the defendants presented considerable evidence
that the Agreement's reference to all terrain vehicles, motorcycles and dirt bikes was
ambiguous, creating a genuine issue of fact that only trial could resolve. In particular, the
Maceys identified more than a dozen references in industry literature to four-wheel ATVs
as "dirt bikes" or "bikes". (R. 1051-1053) They presented David Richards' deposition
testimony that he understood the term "dirt bikes" to be a catch-all phrase, intended to
keep recreational-type vehicles off the easement. Defendants also presented evidence
that Frank Gillmor had never separately discussed four-wheel ATVs with his counsel,
James Elegante. They also presented testimony from Richards' counsel in the 1984
litigation that "our intent was, I believe their agreement and intent at the time was that that recreational vehicles of the A.T.V. type, including dirt bikes, was what was
prescripted by this agreement." (Workman Depo. p. 33-34.)
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Richards presented the affidavits of Tom Howard and Craig Howard, who Frank
Gillmor had allowed to use his land for hunting in exchange for maintaining his fences.
They testified that immediately after the Agreement was signed, Frank Gillmor had
instructed them not to use their four-wheel ATVs on the easement. (R. 1142.)
At the summary judgment stage, the trial court was confronted with conflicting
interpretations of the phrase "dirt bike" created by David Richards' testimony and
material from industry sources that referred to "dirt bikes" as including all types of
ATVs, including four-wheel ATVs. The trial judge also had before him unequivocal
testimony from Richards and his counsel that the intent of the Agreement was to prohibit
all types of recreational vehicles from using the easement and testimony from Frank
Gillmor's 1984 counsel, that four-wheel ATVs were not consciously distinguished from
three-wheel ATVs. (R. 1051.) The trial court was also confronted with the fairly unique
situation that while the Agreement spoke of three-wheel ATVs, those vehicles had been
completely replaced by four-wheel ATVs. Each of these circumstances warranted, and in
fact mandated, that the trial court consider extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of this
provision. Very simply put, the trial court could not conclude, as a matter of law at
summary judgment, that four-wheelers were not included in the Agreement. The trial
court's refusal to grant summary judgment was correct.
B.

The Trial Court's Decision Barring Four-Wheel ATVs Is Correct

Because of ambiguity in the Agreement created by the factors just discussed, the
trial court was required to consider extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' intent.
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah
27

1990). Having properly denied Gillmor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the
trial court was entitled and obligated to consider and weigh extrinsic evidence of the
parties' intent in drafting the provision concerning ATVs. At this level, review of the
trial court's decision is based on the "clearly erroneous" standard. West Valley City, 818
P.2datl313.
Gillmor has failed even to begin to marshal the evidence supporting the trial
court's conclusions that the provision at issue was ambiguous and that the parties
intended to prohibit all ATVs. Where the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the
appellate court may assume that the record supports the trial court's findings. ELM, Inc.,
968 P.2d at 866.
The following evidence supports the trial court's Findings and Conclusions that
four-wheel ATVs should be excluded. Every witness at trial who personally participated
in the 1984 litigation concurred that Richards' principal concern was that the agreement
include a prohibition against recreational vehicles that generated noise, dust and the
potential for off road use. (Elegante at R. 2014, p. 184, 204; Workman at Depo. p. 31-34,
Richards at R. 2008, p. 931.) Four-wheel ATVs present each of these concerns.
James Elegante testified that he was not aware of four-wheel ATVs in 1985.
(R. 2014, p. 194, 196.) Frank Gillmor never discussed four-wheelers with him during the
course of the negotiations (R. 2014, p. 202, 204), and if he and Frank had consciously
distinguished them from three-wheelers, they would have addressed them. (R. 2014,
p. 195, 196.) There was no evidence of any intent by Frank to bar only three-wheelers
and preserve the right to use four-wheelers as Nadine Gillmor suggests. (R. 2014,
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p. 196.) There was never any testimony to suggest that safety was an issue, as opposed to
the dust, noise and potential for off road use. What is clear from this evidence is that no
one, including Frank Gillmor, agreed or intended that four-wheel ATVs could be used on
the road.
The trial court also found that four-wheel ATVs were relatively rare in 1984-1985
but they completely replaced three-wheel ATVs by 1988. (Finding of Fact 23, R. 1715.)
The trial court also found that Frank Gillmor never owned either three or four-wheel
ATVs, and that Nadine Gillmor purchased her first four-wheel ATV after Frank's death
in 1995. (Finding of Fact 24, R. 1715.) This last finding was not challenged by Gillmor.
Nadine Gillmor argues that Richards could not have intended to exclude fourwheel ATVs because he was not aware of them. (Brief, p. 34-35). However, Richards,
Workman and Elegante were all adamant that Richards' concern was with a class of
vehicles that generated noise, dust and the potential for off road use. Elegante testified
that Frank Gillmor understood such vehicles "could be a problem" and gave in on this
issue. (R. 2014, p. 1183-84.)
With respect to ATVs, David Richards testified specifically that:
It ["dirt bikes"] conveyed to me that, by putting quotation marks, dirt bike
refers to motorcycles and refers to three-wheelers, and refers to these all
terrain type vehicles that would be on the road, and that's why I was putting
quotation marks, to broaden that term to include all of these things that we
were talking about. (R. 2008, p. 934.)
While the judge found that the term "dirt bikes" did not include four-wheelers, he
properly concluded that the parties intended to prohibit all types of all terrain vehicles.
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It is also significant here that the manufacture of three-wheeled ATVs was banned
in the United States in approximately 1988 (Finding of Fact 23), and that they have been
replaced entirely by four-wheel ATVs, a vehicle that has the same potential for
generating noise, dust and off road use. See 50 Fed. Reg. 23, 139 (May 31, 1985)
(Consumer Product Safety Commission's advance notice of proposed rule making for
ATVs, noting that "until very recently, almost all ATVs were three-wheeled;" the
Commission's consent decree became effective in 1988); Bitner by Bitner v. American
Honda Motor Co., Inc., 533 N.W.2d 476, 485 (Wis. 1995) (three and four-wheel ATVs
"are intended for a similar purpose").
A court should interpret a contract's terms in light of the reasonable expectations
of the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole, and to the circumstances, nature and
purpose of the contract. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, f 19. This includes viewing the restrictions
in light of the character of the use meant to be prohibited, even in light of innovations or
changes in technology. See, e.g., Callahan v. Weland, 279 So.2d 451 (Ala. 1973) (ruling
that a prohibition against "apartments" was applicable to condominiums as there was no
difference in the nature of the two buildings and condominiums were not prevalent when
the restriction was restriction was drafted); Valley Motor, Inc. v. Almberg, 792 P.2d 1131
(Nev. 1990) (finding that a restriction against "trailers" also applies to "manufactured
homes" as the purpose of the restriction was to keep the character of the neighborhood
comprising permanent dwellings); Knadler v. Adams, 661 P.2d 1052 (Wyo. 1983)
(finding that a restriction of "one residence" includes a restriction against any multiple
living unit).
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Gillmor argues that if Richards' intention was to include four-wheel ATVs with
"dirt bikes" because his intention was unexpressed or subjective, it cannot become a part
of the contract. Gillmor Brief, p. 37. This argument fails for several reasons. Initially, it
is clear from the testimony of those who negotiated the Agreement that they intended to
exclude a class of vehicles and described the class in terms of what existed at the time. In
other words, Richards' intent was clearly expressed and understood.4
Gillmor's final argument on the four-wheel ATV issue is that the trial court failed
to apply the doctrine of practical construction. This doctrine permits a court interpreting
an agreement and determining the parties' intent to look to the construction placed upon
it by the parties' conduct and performance since its execution. Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v.
Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972). She recites a number of facts which she claims
support her assertion. Gillmor Brief at 39. Unfortunately, Gillmor has not cited to the
record in support of those statements and has, again, failed to marshal the evidence on
this claim.
The trial court did focus on the practical construction argument. At the hearing on
post trial motions on January 8, 2003, the trial court stated:
. . . let's go to the next thing, the [doctrine] of practical construction. I It's a fair question, did I consider it? I did.
And the reason I rejected it was not - was because I felt that all the
evidence went to the issue only by one side of the Agreement, one party,
and again, lacking evidence of awareness and acceptance. And I think that
4

Ironically, Gillmor argues that this Court should enforce an unexpressed or
subjective intent of Frank Gillmor to maintain the right to use four-wheeled ATVs. As
Gillmor herself points out, such an intent is not binding.
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made sense on the circumstances. For example, Mr. Macey [sic, Richards]
ceased using the older cabin, he changed his position, he was not affected
by Mr. (inaudible) - 1 beg your pardon - he was not affected by these
things, and I don't think the evidence supports that there was, in fact, a
course of conduct that would support the application of (inaudible) practical
construction. So, to answer your question, whether it needs to be an
additional finding, I don't know, but I considered it in my reasoning and I
rejected it for the reason it was one-sided to me. (R. 2007, p. 12-13.)
Compelling evidence supported the trial court's application of the doctrine. Tom
and Craig Howard testified that Frank told them because of the settlement with Richards,
they had to trailer their ATVs, which were four-wheeled, over the Perdue Creek road up
to the Gillmor property. (R. 2012, p. 561; p. 613-614.) Tom Howard stated they were
told by Frank Gillmor not to:
unload our ATVs or four-wheelers, or four tracks, that we call
them, at the bottom and drive them up [Perdue Creek road]
the way we had been doing, that we had to trailer those
vehicles to the cabin before we unloaded them.
(R. 2012, p. 561.) Craig Howard, Tom's brother, also testified that Frank told them they
had to trailer their ATVs up to the hunting cabin. (R. 2012, p. 613.) The trial court
appropriately took note of the instructions given by Frank Gillmor to the Howards at the
time of the Agreement's execution.
Finally, as discussed previously, the trial court did not find Nadine Gillmor
credible. This Court can assume that her lack of credibility affected the trial court's
decision on this issue as well. For example, she testified that Barry Miller, a one-time
owner of adjacent land formerly a part of the Richards' parcel, saw her using fourwheelers on the Perdue Creek road all the time. (R. 2011, p. 740-741.) Miller denied
ever seeing her on a four-wheeler on the road. (Miller Depo., p. 20, 21.) Gillmor finally
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acknowledged that the one and only time David Richards ever saw her on a four-wheeler
was after Frank's death. (R. 2011, p. 103.) It is significant that Frank Gillmor owned
neither a three or four-wheel ATV. (R. 2011, p. 102.) It was only after Frank's death in
1995 when Nadine Gillmor acquired four-wheelers and her grandchildren moved back to
Utah and wanted to ride them, that the claim they can be used on the road has been made.
Thus, contrary to Gillmor's argument here, the trial court did consider the issue of
practical construction, rejected the evidence advanced by her in support of the argument
and was obviously persuaded by competing evidence.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RENDER ADVISORY OPINIONS.
Gillmor's complaint that the trial court somehow issued advisory opinions is in

error and is simply an expression of her displeasure with the results. While Gillmor's
brief is far from clear, she appears to complain that the trial court issued "advisory
opinions" with respect to: (1) the use of the easement by corporate successors; (2) the
"convoying" of vehicles on the easement; (3) the construction of new structures on the
Gillmor property; and (4) the number of hunters on the Gillmor property. Gillmor Brief
p. 44. Gillmor's complaints are unavailing.
A.

Gillmor Failed to Marshall the Evidence.

In asserting claims of error based on advisory opinions, Gillmor made no effort
whatsoever to marshal the evidence or provide any specific reference to the record or the
trial court's Findings or Conclusions. For this reason alone, this Court should reject
Gillmor's claims that any portion of the judgment is "advisory" in nature. See
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Aspenwood, LLC

v. CAT., LLC,

2003 Utah App. 28, f 44, 73 P.3d 947, 953-54 (Utah

App. 2003), cert, denied, 72 P.3d 685 (Utah 2003).
B.

The Parties' Requests for a Declaration of Rights Did Not Convert the
Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions into Advisory Opinions.

Utah law allows parties to seek a declaration of their rights. U.C.A. § 78-33-1, et
seq., gives the district courts the power to declare legal relations among interested
persons. U.C.A. § 78-33-2 states in part that the court may:
. .. determine any question of construction . . . under the
instrument. . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or
other legal relations thereunder.
U.C.A. § 78-33-3 provides that a contract "may be construed either before or after
there has been a breach thereof."
All parties sought a declaration of rights under the Agreement, including requests
to determine who could use the road, whether the road could be used to transport material
for any purpose not related to animal husbandry, and whether the road could be used to
transport materials to construct a residence. (R. 797 at 804; R. 820 at 827, ^ 10; R. 857 at
867,ffif11, 14; R. 868.) They also sought injunctive relief. (R. 868.) In short, these
matters were appropriately raised under the declaratory judgment statute, and the trial
court resolved them.
Moreover, all of the issues raised at trial were ripe for decision. "Ripeness occurs
when a conflict over the application of a legal provision [has] sharpened into an actual or
imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto." Boyle v.
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National Union Fire Insurance Co., 866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis
added), cert, denied, 236 Utah Adv. 47 (Utah Apr. 5, 1994).
As a general matter, the trial court's conclusions addressed all uses Gillmor
claimed were permitted under the Agreement and which she intended to undertake. This
case is therefore unlike any of the cases Gillmor cites in support of her objection. In
Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake Cty. Comm 'n., 624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981) the court
observed that "there [was] no indication offered that any of the plaintiffs are at present in
violation of any of the provisions of the enacted ordinance, or that they contemplate
violating such provisions in the near future." (Emphasis added.) See also Jenkins v.
Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (discussing standing generally); East Beach
Properties v. Taylor, 552 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 2001) (refusing to rule on issues involving
potential future development on an easement, where there was no specific proposal to
analyze); Hunker v. Whitacre - Greer Fireproofing, Co., 801 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio Ct. App.
2003) (allowing declaratory relief as to whether easement was exclusive, but not for
hypothetical finding if easement was non-exclusive). Cox v. Glenbrook Co., 371 P.2d
647 (Nev. 1962) is also distinguishable from this case. In Cox the Nevada Supreme
Court observed that:
. . . problems arising from the actual use of the way as
distinguished from the privilege to use it, do not, in most
cases, depend upon a construction of the conveying
instrument, but rather upon the consequences resulting from
such actual use. This being so, factual circumstances which
may arise in the future cannot be fairly determined now.
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Cox, 371 P.2d at 655. Unlike Cox, the trial court's ruling in this case focuses upon the
"privilege to use" the Perdue Creek road and Gillmor's stated positions and intentions
with respect to such privileges, and is not dependent upon the unknown potential
consequences of actual use.
C.

The Issue of Consortiums, Corporate Ownership and the Life of the
Personal Grant to Frank Gillmor Were All Appropriate Issues for
Resolution.

The question of the interpretation of the personal grant to Frank Gillmor and his
family was raised by Gillmor in her deposition and again at trial. (R. 2012, p. 420.)
Gillmor testified in her deposition that she was in the process of transferring her property
into a generation-skipping trust for the benefit of her grandchildren and their heirs in
perpetuity. (R. 2012, p. 422.) In subsequent testimony, Gillmor testified that a right of
unfettered access for any purpose was not limited to her and her family. (R. 2012,
p. 426.) During the same line of questioning, Gillmor's counsel represented to the Court
that:
The role of the Court in this litigation is to interpret the
agreement as it is written, interpret what the acceptable uses
are under the Easement Agreement, and then, if particular
evidence or situations arise of undue burden on the servient
estate under those uses which cannot be litigated here in the
abstract, we could get to them." (R. 2012, p. 429,1. 20 - 430,
1.1.)
The trial court concluded that:
It was clearly not the intention of the parties that this grant [in
Section 3(a)] should open the easements to heavy use in the
event of corporate ownership, or even purchase by a
consortium of owners. In the event the record owner(s) are
ever other than an identifiable immediate family (for
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example, siblings, and their families to the first degree of
consanguinity are legitimate successors to the easement
grant), then this provision will fail.
(R. 1711 at 1721.) This language is mirrored in the Judgment (R. 1785).
This conclusion and the Judgment are in direct response to Gillmor's testimony at
trial about her intentions to end run the narrowly crafted personal grant in paragraph 3(a)
and her professed belief that she can avoid it limitations.5
D.

The Dispute Over Convoys of Vehicles Was Ripe for Decision,

Gillmor's assertion - without marshalling evidence or citing to the record - that
the issue of vehicle convoys was not properly before the trial court is in error. At trial,
the undisputed evidence proved the parties negotiated in the Agreement to preclude
excessive use of the road during the hunting season by vehicles going to the Gillmor
property. (R. 2015, p. 1156, 57.) Gillmor made an explicit claim in her post-trial
motions that she could avoid the six vehicle limitation in paragraph 6 by "shuttling "
people to the property.
Furthermore, although Gillmor acknowledges that she can
have no more than 18 licensed hunters on her property by the
Perdue Creek road at any one time, there is no limit
concerning the number of non-hunters who can accompany
the hunters. Thus, for example, while there can only be 18
licensed hunters, those hunters are entitled to take spouses or
children with them . . ., even if that requires a shuttling of
people to the property.
(R. 1812, p. 18-19.) These claims made the issue of convoying vehicles ripe for decision.
5

Although the issue of the future of the personal right of access after the three
generations addressed in the Agreement was clearly raised by Nadine Gillmor's claims, a
correct interpretation of the personal right of access avoids the problems addressed by the
Conclusion of Law. See Section I, p. 47 below.
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E.

The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions with Respect to Cabin
Construction Was Not an Advisory Opinion.

Gillmor's assertion that the trial court could not address use of the road for
construction is without basis. Gillmor herself raised the issue of whether the Perdue
Creek road could be used for construction access for additional cabins. (See R. 2012,
p. 449 . 451.) in Finding 18 (R. 1714), the trial judge found that:
. . . Richards absolutely did not intend that Gillmor could use
the servient property to aid construction (of additional
structures) in any way. The parties did not intend, and the
agreement does not provide for Gillmor to use the servient
estate for construction access in any form, such as
transportation of building materials or construction workers."
The Conclusions of Law at R. 1721 contain the statement that:
This easement may not be used to engage in new construction
on the Gillmor property, in the guise of maintenance. Access
for any work on the Gillmor property that does not fit clearly
within the definition of access route maintenance must
qualify as "animal husbandry.
This language is mirrored in the Judgment under Section 3 at R. 1784. Gillmor's explicit
claims required the trial court to determine whether the easement could be used for new
construction, and having done so, it was appropriate for the court to couch its decision in
general terms rather than limiting the interpretation to Gillmor's current plans.
F.

The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions with Respect to the
Number of Hunters Was Not Advisory,

Without marshalling evidence or referencing any specific Findings or
Conclusions, Gillmor asserts that the trial court's findings set presumptive limits on the
number of hunters on the Gillmor property. Nowhere in the Findings, Conclusions or
Judgment, does the Court set "presumptive" limits for numbers of hunters on the Gillmor
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property. The only issue the Court addressed is how many hunters can be on the Gillmor
property having used the easement as access. Because there are other means of access to
the Gillmor property (R. 2011; p. 726-729), there could be hundreds of people on the
Gillmor property, but under the terms of the Agreement only 18 of them can be on the
property having traveled over the Perdue Creek road.
For all of these reasons, Gillmor's claims that the trial court rendered "advisory
opinions" is incorrect.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED GILLMOR'S MOTION TO AMEND,
Gillmor's asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her

motion to amend her complaint to add a new claim seeking to rescind the agreement
between Richards and her late husband. Gillmor sought to add the claim on the basis
that, because Frank never would have entered into the agreement that did not preserve all
of his claimed prescriptive rights, there was no meeting of the minds. (R. 424 at 432,
Count IV.) Put another way, sixteen years after the fact, Nadine Gillmor sought to undo
a written, on the record settlement, to which she was not a party, on the basis that there
was no meeting of the minds between her husband and Richards.
The trial court's ruling denying that portion of her motion to amend is governed by
the abuse of discretion standard. Trethway v. Furstenau, 2001 UT App. 400, ^f 7, 40
P.3d 649, 653 (Utah App. 2001). An amendment is not permitted under all
circumstances, and a trial court may appropriately deny such a motion if it would be
unfairly prejudicial, futile, or would constitute an attempt to assert theories opposite to
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those asserted earlier in the litigation. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041,
1046 (Utah App. 1994).
In seeking reversal of the trial court's decision, Gillmor has failed to address all
the reasons the trial court denied her motion in the first place. For example, the trial
court considered the pleadings and the parties' oral arguments, and ruled:
The Court. . . finds that the claims that plaintiff proposes to
add by the Amended Complaint are barred by, among other
things, Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, principles
of res judicata; equitable bars, including laches, principles
regarding the sanctity of agreements, and for the other
reasons set forth in the pleadings of defendants, the plaintiffs
claims fail as a matter of law...
On these bases, the trial court denied the motion to amend,
as to any attempt to set aside the 1985 Order entered by the
District Court, the 1985 Agreement between Charles Frank
Gillmor and David K. Richards & Co., or any attempt to
claim a prescriptive easement based on events occurring prior
to 1984.
(R 776.) Gillmor's Motion to amend her other claims was granted and her second
amended complaint was filed on December 3, 2001. (R. 797.)
The trial court's ruling adopted the defendants' arguments opposing Gillmor's
motion to amend: it was futile, as a legal matter; it was highly and unfairly prejudicial;
and it reflected an attempt to change horses midstream.
Gillmor's proposed amendment was futile for several reasons. First, the trial court
was persuaded to deny the amendment as futile because it was time barred by Rule 60
(b)(1), which provides a three month deadline for opening up a judgment on the basis of
mistake. As this Court once explained, there "is an institutional hesitancy to relieve a
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party from a stipulation negotiated and entered into with the advice of counsel." Richins
v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Birch
v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah App. 1989)). Gillmor's argument that her claim was
brought "timely" under Rule 15 fails to take account that her motion was held untimely
because it was sixteen years too late under Rule 60, not because it was made several
months before trial. The trial court's ruling on this basis was not an abuse of discretion.
Likewise, Gillmor's claim to rescind was barred by res judicata, which prohibits
re-litigation of a matter when (1) both actions involve the same parties, or their privies or
assigns; (2) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the claim
asserted in the earlier litigation is asserted later. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247
(Utah 1988). Res judicata applies because Nadine Gillmor admitted she was Frank's
assignee; the prior lawsuit was resolved on its merits in an Order and Judgment; and the
claim Nadine wanted to assert, Frank's prescriptive easement, was the same claim Frank
brought in the earlier lawsuit.
Gillmor's proposed amendment was also futile because it sought to overturn the
settlement agreement between Frank Gillmor and Richards. The trial court was
appropriately reluctant to set aside a settlement agreement. See Ostler v. Buhler, 957
P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998) (holding that "settlement agreements are favored in the law
and should be encouraged because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the
parties, but also to the judicial system."). This reluctance exists even where a party seeks
to rescind on the basis of mistake. See Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d
688, 692 (Utah 1985) (refusing to rescind settlement on mistake theory where both
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parties were not mistaken as to subject matter of settlement). Considering the undisputed
facts that the Agreement, as well as the stipulation and order of dismissal, and order and
judgment, were drafted by Frank Gillmor's attorney, that portions of the Agreement were
read into the record in 1985, and that the parties executed the agreement in open court,
the trial court correctly ruled that the amendment was futile. (R 776.)
Other important arguments were persuasive to the trial court. Nadine Gillmor
lacked standing to overturn the settlement agreement and judgment. Overturfv.
University of Utah Med. Ctr, 973 P.2d 413 (Utah 1999) (holding that a person not a party
of record to the original lawsuit lacks standing to set aside settlement agreement).
Moreover, Gillmor could not show that her claim to rescind the Agreement would allow
the parties to restore the status quo ante, a required showing for rescission. See
Monstrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 579-80 (Utah App. 1993) (party must show it is
possible to restore status quo when seeking rescission) cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah
1994). Finally, the trial court correctly ruled that Gillmor's claimed amendment was
barred by laches, which applies to equitable claims like rescission, and bars recovery
when there has been a delay by one party that causes disadvantage to the other. Plateau
Min. Co., 802 P.2d at 731. Courts are reluctant to set aside compromise agreements and
judgments made late in the game. In re Estate ofChasel, 725 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1986);
Richins,SU?.2d382.
Gillmor's motion to amend also unfairly prejudiced the defendants because there
was no way they could cross-examine Frank Gillmor, who was supposedly the party
"mistaken" about the Agreement. Bekins Bar VRanch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah
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1983) (courts should not allow an amendment that would cause unfair prejudice).
Finally, Gillmor's attempt to rescind the Agreement was directly contrary to her attempt,
earlier in this litigation, to enforce the Agreement by means of a motion for preliminary
injunction. (R 21.) Leave to amend is denied when parties attempt to change horses
midstream. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984).
Gillmor's claim that the savings clause of Rule 60(b) allows her to assert a claim
of mistake to rescind her husband's agreement is without basis. The U.S. Supreme Court,
interpreting the savings clause in Federal Rule 60 (b), which is identical to Utah's rule,
explained the clause is "reserved for those cases of injustices where, in certain instances,
are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid adherence to the doctrine
of res judicata." United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998); see also St. Pierre v.
Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah 1982) (stating that the clause allows a court to review
"an unconscionable judgment or order" through an independent action). Gillmor did not
raise before the trial court any exceptional circumstances or allegations that the prior
judgment was unconscionable. Even if she had, the trial court's finding that she was
barred by the doctrine of laches was sufficient to preclude any such independent action.
See Simons v. United States, 452 F.2d 1110, 1117-18 (2nd Cir. 1971) (independent action
to set aside decree barred by laches due to delay and death of key witness). Where Frank
Gillmor had operated under the agreement for more than a decade until his death without
any allegation of mistake, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gillmor's
attempt to set aside the Agreement on the basis of Rule 60(b)'s savings clause. In any
event, even if the trial court was wrong in failing to allow the amendment its error would
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have been harmless. Rule 61, U.R.C.P. Nadine Gillmor's claim was, in essence, that
Frank never agreed to give up any of his historical rights regarding use of the road.
Frank's own attorney, James Elegante, the only living person who was actively involved
in the negotiation on behalf of Frank, readily acknowledges that Frank made concessions
to obtain the Agreement (R. 2014, p. 194-195.) The trial court stated during post trial
motions that the Agreement represented a compromise by Gillmor. (R. 2007, p. 20.) The
trial court correctly denied Gillmor's attempt to bring a claim to rescind the Agreement.
Although Gillmor's motion was made under Rule 15 (R. 424), she argues that her
efforts to set aside the Agreement are based upon equitable principles applicable to Rule
60 alluded to In the Matter of Baby Boyd Doe, 894 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Utah App. 1995).
However, Gillmore ignores the legal principles in Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259 (Utah
App. 1992), referred to in Baby Boyd Doe. As discussed in Maertz, laches is one of the
factors mitigating against granting a motion like Gillmor's. Id. at 261. Here, one of the
parties to the Agreement, Frank Gillmor, was deceased. Defendants would have had no
opportunity to examine him regarding the Agreement. Laches was one of the bases
specifically cited by the trial court in its ruling.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL
1.

Did the Trial Court Err in Ruling that the Agreement Permits Plaintiff, Her
Children and Grandchildren to Use the Easement for Personal Use?
A.

Did the trial court err in ruling that a grant of personal access to
"[Frank] Gillmor and his immediate family to the first degree of
consanguinity, and their spouses and children" included Nadine
Gillmor, her children and grandchildren?
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B.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the provision in the Agreement
that the easements and limitations run with the land permits successors
to Frank Gillmor, including generations later than his grandchildren,
to enjoy the personal right of access granted to Frank Gillmor and his
immediate family to the first degree of consanguinity?

C.

Did the trial court err in determining that Section 3(a) of the Easement
Agreement is ambiguous if the successor owner is not a single
individual?

The standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of a contract, and the initial
question of whether a contract is ambiguous, is a question of law and is reviewed for
correctness. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1313. If the contract is unambiguous, the
interpretation of the contract is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. If the
contract is ambiguous, and the trial court admits extrinsic evidence to clarify the parties'
intent, the trial court's construction is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.
The issue was preserved for appeal at, among others, R. 1575 and R. 2015,
p. 1287.
2.

Did the Trial Court Err in Ruling that There Can Only be 18 Hunters,
Rather than 18 Persons on the Gillmor Property Who Access That Property
By Way of the Easements?
The trial court's ruling using the term "hunters" as opposed to "persons" is an

erroneous Conclusion of Law and is reviewed for correctness. West Valley City, 818
P.2datl313.
This issue was preserved for appeal at, among others, R. 2007, p. 36, 37.
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3.

Did the Trial Court Err in Ruling That the Occupant of the Hunting Cabin
on the Gillmor Property has General Rights of Access for Any Purpose
Which is Consistent With Historical Use, and Such Historical Use Includes
"General Recreation"?
The standard of review of a trial court's interpretation of a contract, and the initial

question of whether a contract is ambiguous, is a question of law and is reviewed for
correctness. If a contract is unambiguous, the interpretation of the contract is a question
of law and reviewed for correctness. If a contract is ambiguous, and the trial court admits
extrinsic evidence to clarify the parties' intent, the trial court's construction is reviewed
under the clearly erroneous standard. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1313.
This issue was preserved for appeal at, among others, R. 1792 at 1794.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON CROSS APPEAL
The trial court did error, as a matter of law, by failing to limit Nadine Gillmor's
(and her childrens') personal use of the easement. The personal use of the easement was,
by the language of the Agreement, limited to Frank Gillmor, and his relations to the first
degree of consanguinity. The trial court errored in determining that the "occupants" of
the line shack have a general right of access, as opposed to access for hunting and animal
husbandry. There was no evidence that the occupants of the relocated line shack had ever
used the Perdue Creek road for "general access." Finally, the trial court errored when it
misused the term "hunters" in place of "persons" in stating its ruling on the number of
persons who can use the easement for access to the Gillmor property for hunting.
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ARGUMENTS ON CROSS APPEAL
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD NADINE GILLMOR AND
HER CHILDREN HAVE A PERSONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS,
The trial court ruled that the right of personal access granted to Frank Gillmor and

two generations of his descendants extends to Nadine Gillmor, his wife, and her children
by a prior marriage. (R. 1721.) This ruling is in error.
A.

Marshalling of Evidence.

The Agreement expressly grants a right of personal access to Frank Gillmor and
two generations of his blood descendants:
(a) Vehicular access (ingress and egress) between [the highway and the
Gillmor property]. Such access is hereby limited to access for maintenance
work performed on the Gillmor property . . ., "for access by [Frank]
Gillmor and his immediate family to the first degree of consanguinityf and
their spouses and children', to the Gillmor property, and for animal
husbandry;
(Tr. Ex. 1 at paragraph 3(a).)
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement provides:
4. Covenants to Run with the Land. The exclusive nature of the
Easements herein granted and the limitations on use herein contained are
declared by the parties hereto to be covenants and restrictions which run
with and are appurtenant to the Gillmor Property and the Richards Property,
herein described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of
all present and future owners and/or purchasers, occupants and lessees of
said Properties.
When asked about the phrase "and their spouses and children," Frank Gillmor's
attorney who drafted the Agreement, James Elegante, testified:
Well, at the time Frank was married to Nadine Gillmor, his second wife.
His first - his oldest daughter had divorced, but I know that Frank felt that
the time would come when she would either go back to her first husband or
she would remarry. And his second daughter had yet to marry, and I think
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that Frank had felt that he had always taken his family up there and that his
children ought to be able to do the same. (R. 2014, p. 170.)
Elegante was also asked whether there was any discussion with Frank Gillmor
about Frank and his family's right of access passing to a subsequent owner because the
covenants would run with the land. Elegante responded "absolutely" and went on to say:
I'll tell you what. I mean, I don't think there's any question about that
because Frank, you know, Frank could have done a lot of things with this
land. Jamie was leasing the land, Jamie Gillmor, was working it with his
dad Steve. Steve actually had the lease at the time, but Jamie was the, you
know, out doing the work. They had asked Frank. I [know] for a fact they
had asked Frank to buy the land. There were lots of things that Frank could
have done, and I don't think there was any question because Steve Gillmor
was involved in this, and Steve Gillmor certainly wasn't going to give up
his right to get up there. If he would have bought this land from Frank, he
would have needed them. (R. 2014, p. 218.)
The trial court concluded "... that with the death of Frank Gillmor, and based on
the unambiguous language of Section 4 ("Covenants to Run with the Land"), and the
intention of the parties as determined by the court, this grant inures to the benefit of
Frank's present successor, Nadine Gillmor, her spouse, if any in the future, along with
her children, their spouses and children. (R. 1781, at 1785)."
B.

The Unambiguous Language of Paragraph 3(a) Does Not Include
Nadine Gillmor, Her Children or Grandchildren.

The trial court erred when it ruled that the unambiguous personal grant of access
to Frank Gillmor inures to Nadine Gillmor, who was not related to him by consanguinity.
The only grant of a right of access, other than for the enumerated purposes of hunting,
maintenance work performed on the Gillmor property, maintenance on the road and
animal husbandry, permits: "access by [Frank] Gillmor and his immediate family to the
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first degree of sanguinity, and their spouses and children,. . ." (Tr. Ex. 1, paragraph 3(a)).
During the course of the trial, the trial court observed that this provision was not
ambiguous. (R. 2014, p. 171.)
The trial court based its decision that Nadine Gillmor now has a personal right of
access in part on its finding that, given Frank Gillmor's age and health problems, he must
have been cognizant of his own mortality and a finding that Frank had an intention to
preserve immediate family access to the property, "to which he had substantial personal
commitment. " (R. 1718, para. 48.)
The trial court's conclusion fails to take into account that rights-of-way must be
limited to the uses set forth in the Agreement:
A right-of-way founded upon a deed or grant is limited to the uses, and the
extent thereof as fixed by the grantor deed. . . a right-of-way for one
purpose gained by user cannot be turned into a right-of-way for another
purpose if the latter adds materially to the burden of the servient estate; and
the right derived from user can never outrun or exceed the uses in which it
had its origin. . . the right cannot be enlarged to place a greater burden on or
servitude on the property.
Nielson v. Sandberg, 141 P.2d 696, 701 (Utah 1943) (quoting American Bank-Note Co. v.
New York El R. Co., 129 N.Y. 252 (1891)); see also Labrum, 711 P.2d at 227; Kikta, 766
P.2d at 323 ("Owner of the dominant estate cannot change the extent of the easement or
subject the servient estate to an additional burden not contemplated by the grant of
easement"); Steil, 901 P.2d at 396 ("Where an easement is claimed under a grant, the
extent of the right depends on its terms"). Likewise, unambiguous contractual provisions
are enforceable. See R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1077-78.

49

"Consanguinity" is a relationship by blood, and "affinity" is a relationship by
marriage. See State v. Peterson, 174 P. 2d 843, 847 (Utah 1946). Elegante, who drafted
the language at issue, understood consanguinity does not mean affinity. (R. 2014,
p. 224.) Neither Nadine Gillmor nor her children are related to Frank Gillmor by
consanguinity. (R. 2014, p. 73-74.) Nadine's only relationship to Frank was by affinity.
Nadine's children are not related to Frank at all. As a simple matter of contract
interpretation, neither Nadine nor her children are entitled to the personal grant to Frank
Gillmor in paragraph 3(a). On this basis alone, the trial court's ruling is in error.
The evidence made clear that the parties to the Agreement never intended the
personal grant to Frank Gillmor to extend to anyone besides Frank, his daughters and
their children. David Richards, the only living party to the Agreement, understood the
consanguinity language to include Frank, his two daughters and their three children, and,
on this basis, the language was satisfactory to him. (R. 2008, p. 944-45.) If this language
had instead made reference to the owner of the property and the owner's immediate
family to the first degree of consanguinity, Richards would not have agreed because he
could not have known how many people might be allowed to use the road. (R. 2015,
p. 1086.) The provision's clear reference to Frank allowed Richards to know who had
the personal grant. This is consistent with Elegante's recollection that Frank was
concerned about his daughters and his personal use of the property with them. (R. 2014,
p. 167-168.) Elegante acknowledged there were no discussions of this language.
(R. 2014, p. 220.)
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C

The Provision That the Easements and Limitations Run With the Land
Does Not Expand Frank Gillmor's Personal Right.

The trial court's second reason for concluding that Nadine Gillmor, her children
and her grandchildren were entitled to Frank Gillmor's personal right of access was the
Agreement's reference to the covenants running with the land:
Covenants to Run with the Land. The exclusive nature of the Easements
herein granted and the limitations on use herein contained are declared by
the parties hereto to be covenants and restrictions which run with and are
appurtenant to the Gillmor Property and the Richards Property, herein
described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of all
present and future owners and/or purchasers, occupants and lessees of said
Properties.
(Tr. Ex. 1,1| 4.)
The Agreement's reference to "running with the land" does not convert the
unambiguous specific personal grant to Frank Gillmor into a personal right of access to
Nadine Gillmor. Frank Gillmor included the provision, according to his attorney,
because Frank had been in a lot of litigation and his desire was not to "have to go through
this again." (R. 2014, p. 187.) Thus, the impetus for paragraph 4 was Frank's desire not
to have to litigate with a future owner of Richards' property.6
Paragraph 3(a) granting a personal right of access to Frank Gillmor was not added
to the Agreement until the November 20 draft, (Tr. Ex. 310), the day before the
Agreement was signed. There was no evidence that Frank Gillmor and Richards
discussed, let alone negotiated for, the personal grant to Frank to run from owner to

6

This is consistent with Nadine Gillmor's testimony that Frank never considered
selling his property. (R. 2012, p. 540-541.)
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owner. Although Elegante responded affirmatively when asked if he and Frank discussed
the interplay of the two provisions, the rest of his answer did not refer to anything he said
to Frank or Frank said to him.7 (R. 2014, p. 218.)
That the personal grant was not meant to apply to future owners other than Frank
Gillmor was confirmed by the evidence at trial. Elegante testified to Frank's sentimental
attachment to this property and his fond recollections of taking his daughters there when
they were small. (R. 2014, p. 168.) When asked about the intent of the phrase, "their
spouses and children," Elegante testified, (R. 2014, p. 170):
Well, at the time Frank was married to Nadine Gillmor, his second wife.
His first - his oldest daughter had divorced, but I know that Frank felt that
the time would come when she would either go back to her first husband or
she would remarry. And his second daughter had yet to marry , and I think
that Frank had felt that he had always taken his family up there and that his
children ought to be able to do the same. (Emphasis added.)
It is clear from Elegante's testimony that Frank's view of his property was both
practical and sentimental. On the practical side, he wanted to be sure he had the rights of
access necessary to continue to use the property for summer pasture. At the same time,
he wanted his children and their children to be able to enjoy the beauty of the land.
Because this desire grew out of his history and his family's history with the land, the

Instead Elegante testified that Frank could have sold the property to his cousin
Steve, who was leasing it to run sheep and cattle, and Steve, who was not a party to the
Agreement, would have wanted the rights. Furthermore, although paragraph 4 says the
easements benefit all "present and future owners and/or purchasers, occupants and
lessees" of the properties, there was no suggestion at trial that Steve, as a current lessee,
had a personal right of access for himself and his family to the first degree of
consanguinity and their spouses and children. And Elegante's answer did not suggest any
discussion with Richards about the right of future owners to have this personal access.
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right of personal access was one which quite reasonably he negotiated for himself and
without concern for future owners or even current lessees. It must also be considered in
light of the fact that there were other accesses to Frank's property.
Even if this Court were to conclude that the right granted to Frank in paragraph
3(a) ran with the land because of the covenant language in pargraph 4, this Court should
not expand the language agreed upon in the Agreement and extend the right to anyone
other than those specified in the grant. Nadine Gillmor argued that Frank's personal right
of use should pass from owner to owner. It is clear that this was not intended. The only
permissible interpretation of the Agreement if Frank Gillmor transferred his interest is
that Frank (and the specified family members) could continue to use the easement
(provided they negotiated with the new owners for access to the property). Any other
application of the covenant would give Frank Gillmor something he could not have
gotten and did not obtain by Agreement.
In Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 376 P.2d 940 (Utah 1962), the Supreme
Court refused to stray from express language in a restrictive covenant simply because the
title to the subject property switched hands. The Court considered a restriction placed in
a deed that prohibited the grantee, Nielson, from constructing a hotel on property he
purchased in Salt Lake. The grantor in the deed had two motel operations located on
adjacent parcels and did not want a competing hotel constructed on the property he was
selling to Nielson. The question at trial and on appeal was whether the restrictive
covenant, which precluded the construction of a competing hotel, could be undone by a
new owner of the property. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conclusion on
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this issue observing that to do otherwise would permit the purpose of the covenant to be
frustrated simply by the owner transferring title.
Like the new owner in Metropolitan, Gillmor seeks to read out of the Agreement
its clear and unambiguous personal grant to Frank Gillmor, and thereby frustrate the
intent of the original parties to the Agreement. This is not the bargain Richards
negotiated, and the trial court's attempt to give future owners the benefit of rights that
were personal to Frank Gillmor is in error.
D.

The Trial Court's Interpretation Creates Ambiguities.

Not only did the trial court stray from the unambiguous language of the present
grant to Frank Gillmor, its decision also unnecessarily created new ambiguities. The trial
court acknowledged these problems. For example, the trial court amended the Judgment
to state that the language regarding Frank "is ambiguous as to its meaning if the
successor owner is not a single individual or couple, such as Frank and Nadine Gillmor,
or Nadine Gillmor individually, at this time. It was clearly not the intention of the parties
that this grant should open the easements to heavy use in the event of corporate
ownership, or even purchase by a consortium of owners." (Judgment, R. 1781, p 5.) The
trial court's solution to the ambiguity it created was to hold that if the record owner(s) are
ever other than an identifiable immediate family (including siblings and their families to
the first degree of consanguinity) the provision fails. (Ibid.) In other words, the trial
court treated the words "Frank Gillmor" in paragraph 3(a) as a blank space, into which
any family, but never a corporation, could insert its name.
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The trial court's reasoning and attempt to limit the consequence of its conclusion
on consanguinity is plain error. Its conclusions defeat the limited purpose of this very
personal grant and the intentions of the parties. The trial court's struggle with this
provision can best be resolved by a determination that the personal right granted to Frank
and to two generations of his blood relatives was just that, and nothing more.8
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
"OCCUPANTS OF THE CABIN" HAVE A RIGHT OF ACCESS FOR ANY
HISTORICAL USE, INCLUDING GENERAL RECREATION.
Paragraph 2 of the Agreement identifying the recipients of the easements states

". . . it is acknowledged by Richards that there is one cabin on the Gillmor property, and
that the occupant of such cabin shall have the right to use the Easements for access to
such cabin." In its Judgment, R. 1781 at 1783, the trial court held that:
The "occupant of such cabin" has general rights of access across the
servient estate to access the cabin for any purpose which is consistent with
historical use. Historical uses include animal husbandry (specifically
including fence maintenance), general recreation (e.g. picnics, camping)
and hunting.
This ruling is in error.
A,

The Trial Court's Grant of Access for Any Purpose Consistent With
Historical Use is Contrary to the Express Terms of the Agreement

The trial court's grant of a right of access for general recreation, such as picnics
and camping, to the occupants of the hunting cabin is contrary to express terms of the

This interpretation also precludes Gillmor's attempt to circumvent the threegeneration limit in the personal grant by putting the property in a trust for her
descendants after her grandchildren. (R. 2012, p. 422.)
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Agreement and is erroneous. As discussed above in Section I, paragraph 3 of the
Agreement limits the purposes for which the easements may be used:
The easements herein granted are granted for the following purposes only
and shall not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of
Richards.
Paragraph 3 allows for access along the Perdue Creek road for animal husbandry,
for Frank Gillmor personally, and for maintenance and for hunting. No other uses of
Perdue Creek road are permitted. The limitations on use in paragraph 3 apply to every
easement granted in the Agreement, including the rights of the "occupant of the cabin."
Moreover, Elegante's initial draft of the provision that became paragraph 6 of the
Agreement provided for use by invitees "for recreational purposes." That language was
rejected by Richards. (Tr. Ex. 332, para. 8.) The language was changed to permit use by
invitees for hunting purposes in the final Agreement. (Tr. Ex. 1 para. 6.) The trial
court's extension to the "occupant of the cabin" of new rights violates the express terms
of the Agreement and requires reversal.
B.

The Historical Use of the Cabin Did Not Include General Recreation.

Even if the Agreement were held to be ambiguous as to whether the "occupant of
the cabin" is limited to the uses for invitees set forth in the Agreement, the evidence
showed the "occupants" of the cabin did not historically use the access for general
recreation.
1.

Marshalling the Evidence.

At the time the Agreement was negotiated, Vern Howard and his sons were
considered the "occupant" of the cabin. (R. 2011, p. 878-79.) Vern Howard testified (by
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deposition taken in the 1984 litigation) that his visits to the property were for
maintenance work, and that any recreating was connected to work:
Q.

Q.

I think you have already described the type of work that you do up there,
maintaining the fences, maintaining the roads?
A.

Camping.

Q.

Camping?

A.

Picnicking.

Do you ever go up there camping when you don't do work on Frank Gillmor's
property?
A.

Q.

We may have on occasion gone without working but it's—

It's generally in connection with the work that you do up there; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

The picnicking that you do up there, would that also be generally in connection
with the work that you do?

A.

Well, generally the family goes along and prepares the picnic for the family, and
the rest of us do the work and then you come back and eat.
Q.

A.

I see.

Of if you camp overnight, you - they are there, you know, and we all camp over
together.

(Pltf. Tr. Ex. 19, V. Howard deposition, p. 49-50.) 9

9

Vern Howard's deposition contains additional references to the fact that
picnicking and camping were associated with work on the property and not independent
recreation. (See Tr. Ex. 19, p. 10-11; p. 15; p. 29; p. 33; p. 36; and p. 37-38.) Many of
these references to picnicking and camping, however, were to the period of time before
the current cabin was built in approximately 1981, when the Howards were accessing an
old line shack in a different location that was reached by the White's Basin road, and not
the Perdue Creek road that is at issue in this case.
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Vern Howard's statement that he and his family "may" have gone to the property
on occasion without working is the only evidence of "general recreation" unconnected
with work or hunting.
2.

The Court's Factual Finding Is Clearly Erroneous,

Vern Howard's sons, Tom and Craig, also were asked about their use of the cabin.
Tom Howard testified that their visits were principally for working and hunting:
Q.

But you also picnic up at the line shack up the Perdue Creek, correct?

A.

Mostly that was all work duty up there. It was fencing, it was building the cabin,
and mostly that's all it was.

Q.

So was there any reason that you didn't picnic up there and camp like you used to
[referring to his earlier testimony about White's Creek which involved a different
access road]?

A.

I think mainly just because it came more of a work-oriented detail. We were doing
it as a means to have our deer hunting spot.

(R. 2012, p. 579.)
Tom Howard likewise denied that people who went to work and hunt with them
used the Perdue Creek road to picnic or camp on the Gillmor property other than to hunt:
Q.

Jim Manzanares went up the Perdue Creek road?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And he went up there to picnic, didn't he, and camp?

A.

He was up there to hunt with us.

(R. 2012, p. 580-581.)
Craig Howard explained that they used the road to work and hunt on the property:
Q.

Did Mr. Gillmor tell you that, in exchange for the work you were doing for him up
there, that your family could recreate on that property?
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Q.

A.

A.

He let us hunt, was the agreement.

Q.

Okay, did you ever do anything other than hunt?

A.

We fenced and we hunted.

I am talking about recreation. Did you ever do any recreation other than hunt on
that property?
A.

Well, I did swap (sic) [scope] for animals up there.

Q.

Did you ever have picnics up there with your family?

Occasionally, when we were building the hunting cabin, I recall some
picnicking.

(R. 2012, p. 619.) (emphasis added).
As the testimony of the Howards demonstrates, even if there were some basis for
the trial court to interpret the Agreement to give occupants of the cabin access for any
purpose consistent with historical use, that use did not include general recreation.10
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT 18 HUNTERS, AS
OPPOSED TO 18 PERSONS, CAN ACCESS THE GILLMOR PROPERTY
BY THE EASEMENTS.
The trial court's ruling that "18 hunters" may use the easement under paragraph 6

of the Agreement is an erroneous interpretation of the Agreement. This error is important
because Gillmor has flouted the provision's express limitation of "18 persons," by
allowing invitees to nominate themselves as either "hunters" or "non-hunters" so that
more than 18 people can use the easement. Thus, during any given hunting season, there
10

Lou Stevens, one of the individuals who took over putting up and taking down
fences after Frank Gillmor terminated his arrangement with the Howard group, did testify
that he was told by Frank Gillmor that he could access the property for any reason he
wanted at any time he wanted. (R. 2011, p. 695.) However, Stevens was not putting up
and taking down the fences before the Agreement was signed, so his use was not
historical use in any event.
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are far more than 18 people and six vehicles using the Perdue Creek road for access.
(R. 2015, p. 1156.) This expanded use contravenes an essential element of the
Agreement, i.e., protecting the peace and quiet of the owners of the servient estate.
Paragraph 6 of the Agreement (Tr. Ex. 1), provides that:
Gillmor agrees that he shall not allow more than 18 persons
and six vehicles to use the Easements for hunting purposes at
any time.
The Judgment states that (R. 1787):
The Agreement does not purport to limit the number of
hunters on the Gillmor property, but there can be only
eighteen hunters on the Gillmor property who accessed that
property by way of the easements, and those hunters may not
use more than six vehicles.
During argument on January 8, 2003, counsel for Richards brought this distinction
to the trial court's attention in the following exchange:
Counsel:

. .. Well, if Ms. Gillmor will go back and
look at the Agreement, paragraph six says,
Gillmor agrees he shall not allow more than
18 persons and six vehicles to use the
easement for hunting purposes. Not 18
hunters, 18 persons.

Court:

Yeah.

Ms. Dunning:

So —

Court:

There is simply no grant of easement to all
these others.

(R. 2007, p. 35-36.)
The discrepancy was not corrected by the trial court. There is no evidence in the
record that would warrant changing the language of the Agreement, and it was probably a
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simple oversight by the trial court. The use of the word "persons" in the Agreement is
not ambiguous. The trial court did not indicate it was ambiguous. Its use of the word
"hunters" in place of "persons" is clearly erroneous, and should be corrected on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should:
1.

Determine that the personal right of use granted in the Agreement to Frank
Gillmor and his family does not extend to Nadine Gillmor and her family or
any future owner of the Gillmor property, and reverse the trial court's
contrary conclusion of law at R. 1721.

2.

Determine that the "occupants of the cabin" do not have a general right of
access along the Perdue Creek road and limit their uses to those specified in
the Agreement, i.e., animal husbandry, maintenance and hunting;

3.

Determine that the Perdue Creek road may not be used by Gillmor for
access for more than 18 persons (as opposed to 18 hunters) in six vehicles
during hunting season;

4.

Uphold the trial courts prohibition against use of four-wheel ATVs on the
Perdue Creek road: and

5.

Affirm the balance of the trial court's findings, conclusions and judgment.

DATED this ^ \

b

day of April, 2004.

Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Maceys and Family Link, L.L.C.

Eliz^bethxT. Dunning
s' \
Eric Gr. Maxfield
J
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Attorneys for David K. Richards & Co.
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on this <7\\~~ day of April, 2004, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing CONSOLIDATED BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANTS/
APPELLEES ROBIN MACEY, KEN MACEY, FAMILY LINK, L.L.C., AND
DAVID K. RICHARDS & CO. was served by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon the
following:

David W. Scofield
PETERS SCOFIELD & PRICE
111 East Broadway, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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November 15, 1985 draft Easement and Use Agreement with James Elegante
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4.
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notes, Tr. Ex. 332
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November 20, 1985 draft Easement and Use Agreement, Tr. Ex. 310

6.
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AFTER RECORDING PLEASE
MAIL TO:

""-«>*€

Charles F. Gillmor, Jr.
P. 0. Box 130
Oakley, Utah 84055
EASEMENT AND USE AGREEMENT
This Easement and Use Agreement
and entered

into this

("Agreement") is made

day of

, 1985/ by

and between CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR., an individual
whose

address

DAVID K.

is

P.

RICHARDS

&

O.

Box 130, Oakley,

COMPANY,

INC.,

a

("Gillmor"),

Utah

84055, and

Utah

corporation

("Richards"), with its principal place of business at 303 North
2370 West, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah

84116-

RECITALS:
A.

Gillmor

owns

certain

real

property

located

in

Summit County, State of Utah, described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and by this

reference made

a part hereof, hereinafter

referred to as the "Gillmor Property."
B.
adjacent
Utah,

Richards

to the Gillmor

described

reference

owns

made

certain

Property

real

located

in Summit County, State of

in Exhibit "B" attached
a part

property

hereof, which

hereto

property

and

by

this

is hereinafter

referred to as the "Richards Property."
C.

Certain

existing,

unimproved

roadways

lie upon

the Richards Property and the Gillmor Property commonly
as the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road.

known

The parties

hereto

desire

hereby

to set forth their agreement

standing with respect to the improvement, use
of

said

Roads

to

the

mutual

benefit

of

and under-

and

maintenance

their

respective

Properties.
NOW,

THEREFORE,

in

consideration

of

the

mutual

covenants and agreements herein contained, and for other good
and valuable

consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which

are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Grant

of

Easements.

Gillmor perpetual easements

(the

Richards

hereby

"Easements") over

grants
and

to

across

the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road from the intersection
Weber

of

said

Canyon

roads with

Road)

over

State

and

Highway 213

across

the

(known

Richards

as

the

Property

described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto to the east and south
boundaries

of

the

Gillmor

Property

described

in

Exhibit "A"

attached hereto, to have and to hold the same for the purposes
and subject to the conditions and limitations herein contained.
2.
granted

Exclusive

Easements.

The

Easements

herein

are exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit

of Richards, as grantor, Gillmor as grantee, and the officers,
directors,
Gillmor.
use

invitees,

agents

and

employees

of

Richards

and

Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not

the Easements, or

allow the Easements

to be used by his

invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause
the

Easements

to

become part of the public domain.

Gillmor

specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not deve4-o^- the
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Gillmor property/in such a manner so as to subject the Easements to demands by the public for access to any portion of the
Gillmor

property.

Notwithstanding

the

foregoing,

it

is

acknowledged by Richards that one residence may be constructed
upon

the

Gillmor

Property,

and

that

the

occupant

of

such

residence shall have the right to use the Easements for access
to such residence.
3.

Purposes

of

Easements.

The

Easements

herein

granted are granted for the following purposes only and shall
not be enlarged upon without

the prior

written

consent of

Richards, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
(a) General

vehicular

access

(ingress

and

egress) between the intersection of the Easements with State
Road 213 and the east boundary of the Gillmor Property.

Such

access

work

is

hereby

limited

to

access

for

maintenance

performed on the Gillmor property (including maintenance of the
Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek Road and Neil
Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property),

for recreation

which shall include, among other things, picnicking, camping,
hunting, and fishing, and for animal husbandry; and
(b) General access for animal husbandry, including the herding of livestock, between the intersection of the
Easements with State Road 213 and the east boundary of the
Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not be
limited

to,

equipment

and

personnel

husbandry.
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incident

to

animal

4.

Limitations

on Use of Neil Creek Road Easement.

Notwithstanding the grant of Easement over and across the Neil
Creek Road herein contained, Gillmor hereby agrees not to use
the Neil Creek Road Easement except in emergency situations or
at such times as the Perdue Creek Road is impassible.
5.

Covenants

to Run with

the

Land.

The

exclusive

nature of the Easements herein granted and the limitations on
use herein contained
covenants
to

the

and

benefit

restrictions which run with and are appurtenant

Gillmor

described,

and

of

are declared by the parties hereto to be

all

Property

and

the

shall be binding
present

and

Richards

upon

future

and

Property,

shall

owners

herein

inure to the

and/or

purchasers,

occupants and lessees of said Properties.
6.
parties

Improvement

hereto

of Purdue Creek Road

recognize

that

certain

Easement.

The

improvements

are

necessary to the Perdue Creek Road to make such road suitable
for the purposes herein set forth.

Gillmor and Richards hereby

agree to establish an escrow account for the purpose of funding
said

improvements.

Upon

execution

of

this

Agreement, or as

soon thereafter as practicable, the parties shall establish an
escrow

account

at

Continental

Bank

and Trust

Co., and

each contribute the sum of $5,000 to said account.

shall

All funds

held in such account, including interest earned on said funds,
shall be used solely for the purpose
Creek

Road

between

the

intersection
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of
of

improving
said

Road

the Perdue
to

State

Highway 213 and the east boundary of the Gillmor Property.

All

of said improvements shall be made within one (1) year from the
date

of

this

Agreement.

making

such

deems,

in his

Gillmor

improvements

to

discretion,

the

to

shall
Perdue

be

be

responsible

Creek

necessary

or

connection with the uses authorized herein.
cost

of

making

parties

shall

such
share

improvements
equally

is

less

Road

for

which

he

desirable

in

In the event the
than

in all amounts

$10,000, the

remaining

in the

escrow account on the first anniversary of this Agreement.

If

the

be

cost

of

improvements

exceeds

$10,000, Gillmor

shall

solely responsible to pay such excess amounts.
7.

Maintenance

of

Easements.

The parties acknowl-

edge that the periodic maintenance of the Perdue Creek Road and
the

Neil

Creek

Road

will

be

necessary.

Gillmor

shall

be

responsible for maintaining the Perdue Creek Road Easement and
Richards

shall be

Road Easement.

responsible

for maintaining

the Neil

Creek

Thre—part-i-es—agxee—to— -sli3xe_jequa-l-l-y—i-n tlie exist

o-f—maintaining - t-he- Perd~ue~~Creek—Road—Easements \ Ri-sb-a^ds—slia-1-1
be—&e-l-e4y—respens-ibie -for- the~~cos~tr ~Uf—mainxa-i^ii-ng
G*^ek—Road

the N^jJL,

Easement; provided /—however-;—t-ha4^-G-ilJjnor_sh.a_l.l„Bay

ail—spe-cial maijii^rLance^-ex-pen se^s—rncriT-^ed—by—Ri-eha^d-s—-on-—the_
Ne44—CiLQek_JRo^d_. E a semen t__incu r-^ed—-by-^R-i-chaxds—a^s~—a—reLSJLil±_o_f
G44rlmo r ' s—use—o£—s& id—Ea-s emenfc-a^—herern—a-14-ewe4-»8.
defend

Indemnification.

and hold

the other

Each party agrees to indemnify,

harmless
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from

and

against

any and

costs, losses, liabilities, causes of actions, claims, demands,
damages

and

incurred

by

fees,

including

either

party

willful misconduct

as

reasonable
a result

of

in the use, improvement

attorneys'
the

fees,

negligence

or

or maintenance of

the Easements by either party hereto.
9.

Entire Agreement.

This Agreement constitutes the

entire agreement of the parties hereto relating to the subject
matter hereof, and shall not be modified or amended except by
written instrument executed by both parties hereto.

binding

10.

Binding

upon

and

Agreement.

shall

inure

to

This

Agreement

the benefit

of

shall

be

the parties

hereto, their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees,
heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns.
11.
herein,

and

Default.
the

of

default

rights

and

limitations, covenants

contained, are unique.
event

The

interests

granted

and conditions

herein

The parties therefore agree that in the

hereunder

by

either

party,

the

following

remedies shall be available to the aggrieved party:
(a)

An

action

for

specific

performance

under

this Agreement;
(b)

An action

for damages

incurred

as a result

of such default; and
(c)

Any other rights or remedies provided by law

or in equity.
12.

Notices.

Any notices required or permitted here-

under shall be deemed duly delivered when delivered
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personally

or when mailed

in the United

States Mail, postage prepaid,

certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, and
addressed to the respective addresses for the parties set forth
in the first paragraph of this Agreement.
13.

Governing

Law.

This

Agreement

is

made

and

entered into in the State of Utah and shall be construed and
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
or have caused these presents to be executed by the duly and
authorized officers the day and year first above written.

CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR.
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC.

By:
DAVID K. RICHARDS
President
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

)
:
)

ss.

On this
day of November, 1985 personally
appeared before me Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., a signer of the
within and foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

)
:
)

ss.

On
this
day
of
November,
1985
personally
appeared before me David K. Richards, who, being by me duly
sworn did state that he is the President of David K. Richard &
Company, Inc., a Utah corporation, and that the within and
foregoing instrument was executed by authority of the By-laws
or the Resolution of the Board of Directors of said corporation
and said David K. Richards acknowledged to me that said
corporation executed the same.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:
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EXHIBIT "A"
GILLMOR PROPERTY
Real Property located in Summit County,
State of Utah, and described as follows:

All of Sections 26 and 25, the south 637.33
acres of Section 23 and the south 318.67
acres of the west half of Section 24 and the
east 98.2 acres of Section 34, TIN, R6E,
SLB&M. Contains 2306.53 acres.

EXHIBIT "B"
RICHARDS PROPERTY
Real Property located in Summit County,
State of Utah, and described as follows:

Township 1 SOuthf
Base & Meridian
Section 2:

Range

6 East,

All (Containing
more or less)

Township 1 North, Range
Base & Meridian

Salt

Lake

608.45 acres,

6 East,

Salt

Lake

Section 25:

All (Containing
more or less)

641.48 acres,

Section 36:

All (Containing
more or less)

598.60 acres,

Township 1 North,
Base & Meridian
Section 30:

Range 7 East, Salt

Lake

All (except the East 156.05
acres, more or less, thereof,
particularly
described
as
follows, to wit:)
Beginning
at the Northeast
corner of said Section 30,
Township
1 North, Range 7
East,
SLB&M,
and
running
thence South 5280 feet, more
or
less,
to
the
South
boundary line of said Section
30; thence West 1287.41 feet;
thence North 5280 feet, more
or
less,
to
the
North
boundary line of said Section
30; thence East 1287.41 feet,
more or less, to the place of
beginning.
(Containing
156.05 acres, more or less)

Section 31:

Nl/2; N1/2SW1/4;
and
that
portion of the S1/2SW1/4 and
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that
portion of the SE1/4
lying
North
of
the
South
right-of-way boundary line of
Utah State Highway No. 213.
Containing 559.89 acres, more
or less)
Township 1 North, Range
Base & Meridian
Section 24:

Lake

The El/2 (W1/2E1/2 and all of
Lots
1,
2,
3
and
4)
(Containing
321.12
acres,
more or less)

Township 1 North, Range
Base & Meridian
Section 19:

6 East, Salt

7 East,

Salt

Lake

The Wl/2 (E1/2W1/2 and all of
lots 1, 2, 3 and 4) except
the East 396 feet of said
one-half section (Containing
270.06 acres, more or less)

Qu>s J>
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November 15, 1985

L. Craig Metcalf
WORKMAN, NYDEGGER & JENSEN
57 West 200 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
HAND DELIVERED
Dear Craig:
I have reviewed the easement proposal which you
forwarded to me in connection with the above-referenced matter.
As I mentioned to you in our telephone conversation
concerning the easement, it was my impression from the meeting
that we had with you, Ross Workman and Mr. Richards on Monday,
November 4, 1985, that Mr. Richards' main concern was the number
of people go up onto Frank's property by using the easements.
Frank, too, shares that concern and understands that Mr.
Richards may like to know exactly who the people are that are
going up there and how many there would be each year.
Accordingly, I have redrafted the easement to provide for some
mechanism by which Frank would provide that information to Mr.
Richards each year. By the same token Frank feels that he could
better patrol the hunting on his property by persons who buy
permits from Richards to hunt on Richards' property but who
cross over onto Frank's property to hunt. He would thus like to
have the same type of information from Mr. Richards each year.
In this manner I believe that they could each gain a little
better control over who goes up onto the property.

L. Craig Metcalf
November 15, 1985
Page 2

I would like to emphasize to you again and ask you to
convey to Mr.Richards that/ like Mr. Richards, Frank is very
interested in keeping control over who goes onto his property
and how they get there. Mr. Richards may think that Frank is
indiscriminate in this regard, but I can assure you that from
everything that I have been able to learn during the preparation
of this lawsuit, Frank is very aware at all times of who is
going to be going up onto his property and the reasons for which
they are going up there. I believe that if the goals of Mr.
Richards and Frank are essentially the same, we, as artful
draftsmen/ should be able to assist them in finding language
which would be suitable to both of them to achieve their goals.
As I mentioned further in our telephone conversation/
the easement which I have enclosed herewith attaches to the
property.
We will be prepared to discuss with you on Monday in
Coalville this easement. I have stamped the easement showing
that it is a draft. I have not been able to discuss in detail
with Frank the wording of the easement draft which is enclosed/
but Frank would agree in principle to these terms.

Sincerely/

JME:ldra
Enclosure

y James M. Elegante

AFTER RECORDING PLEASE
MAIL TO:
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr,
P. 0. Box 130
Oakley, Utah 84055
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EASEMENT AND USE AGREEMENT
This Easement and Use Agreement
and entered

into this

("Agreement") is made

day of

, 1985, by

and between CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR., an individual
whose

address

DAVID K.

is

P.

RICHARDS

0.

&

Pox

130, Oakley,

COMPANY,

INC.,

a

( "Gillmor"),

Utah

84055, and

Utah

corporation

("Richards"), with its principal place of business at 303 North
2370 West, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah

84116.

RECITALS:
A.

Gillmor

owns

certain

real

property

located

in

Summit County, State of Utah, described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, hereinafter
referred to as the "Gillmor Property."
B.
adjacent
Utah,

Richards

to the Gillmor

described

reference

owns

made

Property

in Exhibit
a part

certain

real

in Summit

"B" attached

hereof, which

property

located

County, State of

hereto

property

is

and

by

this

hereinafter

referred to as the "Richards Property."
C.

Certain

existing,

unimproved

roadways

the Richards Property and the Gillmor Property

lie

commonly

as the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road.

upon
known

The parties

hereto desire hereby

to set

standing with respect
of

said

roads

to

agreement

and under-

to the improvement, use and

maintenance

the

forth

mutual

their

benefit

of

their

respective

Properties.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration

of the mutual cove-

nants and agreements herein contained, and for other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy

of which are

hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Grant

Gillmor perpetual

of

Easements.

easements

Richards

hereby

(the "Easements") over

grants
and

to

across

the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road from the intersection
Weber

of

said

Canyon

roads

Road)

with

over

State Highway

and

across

213

the

(known

Richards

as

the

Property

described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto to the east and south
boundaries

of

the

Gillmor

Property

described

in

Exhibit

"A"

attached hereto, to have and to hold the same for the purposes
and subject to the conditions and limitations herein contained.
2.

Exclusive

Easements.

The

Easements

herein

granted are exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit
of Richards, as grantor, Gillmor as grantee, and the officers,
directors,
Gillmor.

invitees,

agents

and

employees

of

Richards

and

Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not

use the Easements, or allow

the Easements

to be

used

invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as
the Easements

to become

part

of

the public

domain.

by his

to cause
Gillmor

specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not allow the
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in such a manner so as

Gillmor property to be used

to subject

the Easements to demands by the public for access to any portion of the Gillmor

property.

Notwithstanding

the

foregoing,

it is acknowledged by Richards that one residence may be constructed

upon

the Gillmor

such residence shall have

Property, and
the right

that

the occupant of

to use the Easements for

access to such residence.
3.

Purposes

of

Easements.

The

Easements

herein

granted are granted for the following purposes only and shall
not

be

enlarged

upon

without

the

prior

written

consent

of

Richards, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
(a)
egress) between
Road

213

and

Property.

General

vehicular

the intersection

the

east

and

of

south

access

(ingress

the Easements with

boundaries

of

the

and
State

Gillmor

Such access is hereby limited to access for mainte-

nance work performed on the Gillmor property (including maintenance of the Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek
Road and Neil Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property), for
recreation which shall include, among other things, picnicking,
camping, hunting, and fishing, and for animal husbandry; and
(b)

General access for animal husbandry, includ-

ing the herding of livestock, between the intersection of the
Easements

with

State Road

213

and

the

east

boundary

of

the

Gillmor Property, which access

shall include, but shall not be

limited

personnel

to,

equipment

and

husbandry.
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incident

to

animal

4.

Limitations

on Use of Neil Creek

Road

Easement.

Notwithstanding the grant of easement over and across the Neil
Creek Road herein contained, Gillmor hereby agrees not to use
the Neil Creek Road Easement except in emergency situations or
at such times as the Perdue Creek Road is impassible.
5.

Covenants

to Run

with

the

nature of the Easements herein granted

Land.

The

exclusive

and the limitations on

use herein contained are declared by the parties hereto to be
covenants and restrictions which run with
to

the

Gillmor

described,
benefit

and

of

all

Property
shall

and

the

be binding

present

and

and are

Richards

upon and

future

Property,

shall

owners

appurtenant

inure

and/or

herein
to the

purchasers,

occupants and lessees of said Properties.
6.

Improvement

parties hereto recognize

of Perdue Creek
that certain

Road

improvements

sary to the Perdue Creek Road to make such
the purposes

herein

set

forth.

Easement.

Gillmor

The

are neces-

road suitable for

and

Richards

hereby

agree to establish an escrow account for the purpose of funding
said

improvements.

soon thereafter as
escrow

account

Upon

execution

of

this Agreement,

or

as

practicable, the parties shall establish an

at Continental

Bank

and

Trust

Co., and - shall

each contribute the sum of $5,000 to said account.

All funds

held in such account, including interest earned on said funds,
shall be used solely
Creek

Road

between

Highway 213 and

for
the

the east

the purpose of
intersection

of

improving
said

and south boundaries
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Road

the Perdue
to

State

of the Gillmor

property.

All

(1) year

of said

from

the date

responsible

for making

Road

he

which

improvements shall be made within one
of

this Agreement.

such

improvements

deems, in his

desirable

in connection

the event

the cost
the

parties

remaining

in the escrow

this Agreement.

such

shall

share

account

If the cost

on

to be

improvements
equally
the

shall be

the Perdue

or

herein.

In

is less than

in

first

Creek

necessary

the uses authorized

of making

$10,000,

to

discretion,

with

Gillmor

all

amounts

anniversary

of

of improvements exceeds $10,000,

Gillmor shall be solely responsible to pay such excess amounts.
7.

Maintenance

of Easements.

The

parties

acknowl-

edge that the periodic maintenance of the Perdue Creek Road and
the

Neil

Creek

Road

will

be

necessary.

Gillmor

shall

be

responsible for maintaining the Perdue Creek Road Easement and
Richards

shall

Road Easement.

be responsible

for maintaining

the Neil

Richards agrees to pay to Gillmor that portion

of each hunting permit which Richards sells during
which

is

Creek

designated

for

road

maintenance

and

each year

repair,

which

amount shall not be less than $20 per permit and which amount
shall be used by Gillmor strictly for repair and maintenance of
the

Perdue

Richards

Creek

each

Road.

year

that

Gillmor
the

agrees

amount

paid

to

provide

to him

by

proof

to

Richards

hereunder shall have been expended by Gillmor for such maintenance and repair and Richards agrees to provide Gillmor proof
of the number of hunting permits sold by him.
8.

Designation

of

Use

of

Easements

by

Invitees.

Gillmor agrees that he shall not allow more than 25 persons and
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seven vehicles to use the Easements
at any time.

Gillmor further

for

recreational

purposes

agrees that he shall provide to

Richards a list of persons whom he will allow to use the Easements during

each year.

Gillmor

further agrees

that

he will

require each vehicle using the Easements to carry and to display on its windshield
use

the

hunting

Easements.

identification as a vehicle allowed to

Gillmor

season he will

further

require

each

agrees

that

invitee

during

to maintain

the
some

mark of identification to be displayed during the time that he
uses the Easements.

Richards agrees that he will

provide to

Gillmor a list of persons who will use the Easements for hunting purposes during the hunting season each year, and Richards
agrees that he will require each person obtaining from Richards
a hunting permit or hunting on Richards1 property adjacent to
Gillmor's

property

with

permission

to

carry

identification so that he can be identified as

some

mark

such.

of

Gillmor

agrees that he will not allow use of and will not himself use
any

three-wheeled

two-wheeled
Easements

motorized

motorcycles

at any

All

or

time, and

Terrain

motorized

Vehicles

"dirt

Richards agrees

bikes"
that

or

any

on

the

he will not

allows use of such vehicles on the Perdue Creek Road.
9.

Indemnification.

Each party agrees to indemnify,

defend and hold the other harmless from and against any and all
costs, losses, liabilities, causes of actions, claims, demands,
damages

and

incurred

by

fees,
either

including
party

as

reasonable
a

-6-

result

of

attorneys'
the

fees,

negligence

or

willful

misconduct

in

the use, improvement

or

maintenance of

the Easements by either party hereto.
10.

Entire Agreement.

This Agreement constitutes the

entire agreement of the parties hereto relating to the subject
matter hereof, and shall not be modified or amended except by
written instrument executed by both parties hereto.
11.

Binding Agreement.

This Agreement shall be bind-

ing upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto,
their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees, heirs,
personal representatives, successors and assigns.
12.

Default.

The rights and interest granted herein,

an the limitations, covenants and conditions herein contained,
are unique.

The parties therefore agree that in the event of

default hereunder by either party, the following remedies shall
be available to the aggreived party:
(a)

An

action

for

specific

performance

under

this Agreement;
(b)

An

action for damages incurred

as a result

of such default; and
(c)

Any other rights or remedies provided by law

or in equity.
13.

Notices.

Any notices required or permitted here-

under shall be deemed duly delivered when delivered personally
or

when

mailed

in

the

United

States

Mail,

postage

prepaid,

certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, and
addressed to the respective addresses for the parties set forth
in the first paragraph of this Agreement.

-7-

14.
entered

Governing

Law.

This

Agreement

is

made

into in the State of Utah and shall be construed

and
and

interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have
or have caused

these presents to be executed

executed

by the duly and

authorized officers the day and year first above written.

CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR.
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC,

By:
DAVID K. RICHARDS
President

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
day of November, 1985, personally appeared
On the
before me Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., the signer of the within and
foregoing
instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

-8-

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the
day of November, 1985, personally appeared
before jne David K. Richards, who, being by me duly sworn, did
say that he is the President
of David K. Richards & Company,
Inc., a Utah corporation, and that said within and foregoing
instrument was executed by authority of its By-laws or the
Resolution of the Board of Directors of said corporation and
said David K. Richards acknowledged to me that said corporation
executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

1375J
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EXHIBIT "A"
GILLMOR PROPERTY
Real Property located in Summit County,
State of Utah, and described as follows:
All of Sections 26 and 25, the south 637.33 acres
of Section 23 and the south 318.67 acres of the
west half of Section 24 and the east 98.2 acres
of Section34, TIN, R6E, SLB&M. Contains 2306.53
acres.

EXHIBIT

W

BW

RICHARDS PROPERTY
Real Property located in Summit County,
State of Utah, and described as follows:
Township
Meridian

1

Section 2:
Township
Meridian

1

South,

Range

6

East,

All (Containing
less)
North,

Range

6

Salt

608.45

East,

Lake

Base

acres, more

Salt

Lake

Base

&
or
&

Section 25:

All (Containing
less)

641.48

acres, more

or

Section 36:

All (Containing
less)

598.60

acres, more

or

Township
Meridian

1

Section 30:

North,

Range

7

East,

Salt

Lake

Base

&

All (except the East 156.05 acres, more
or
less,
thereof,
particularly
described as follows, to wit:)
Beginning at the Northeast corner of
said Section 30, Township
1 North,
Range 7 East, SLB&M, and running thence
South 5280 feet, more or less, to the
South boundary line of said Section 30;
thence West 1287.41 feet; thence North
5280 feet, more or less, to the North
boundary
line
of
said
Section
30;
thence East 1287.41 feet, more or less,
to the place of beginning.
(Containing
156.05 acres, more or less)

Section 31:

Nl/2; N1/2SW1/4; and that portion of
the S1/2SW1/4 and that portion of the
SE1/4
lying
North
of
the
South
right-of-way
boundary
line
of
Utah
State
Highway
No.
213.
Containing
559.89 acres, more or less)

Township
Meridian

1

Section 24:

Township
Mer idian

1

Section 19:

North,

Range

6

East,

Salt

Lake

Base

&

The El/2 (W1/2E1/2 and all of Lots 1,
2, 3 and 4) (Containing 321.12 acres,
more or less)
North,

Range

7

East,

Salt

Lake

Base

&

The Wl/2 (E1/2W1/2 and all of lots 1,
2, 3 and 4) except the East 396 feet of
said
one-half
section
(Containing
270.06 acres, more or less)

AFTER RECORDING PLEASE
MAIL TO:
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr.
P. 0. Box 130
Oakley, Utah 84055

//W5vf^

EASEMENT AND USE AGREEMENT
This Easement and Use Agreement
and entered into this

("Agreement") is made

day of

, 1985, by

and between CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR., an individual
whose

address

DAVID K.

is P.

RICHARDS

0.

&

Pox

130, Oakley,

COMPANY,

INC.,

a

("Gillmor"),

Utah

84055, and

Utah

corporation

("Richards"), with its principal place of business at 303 North
2370 West, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah

84116.

RECITALS:
A.

Gillmor

owns

certain

real

property

located

in

Summit County, State of Utah, described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, hereinafter
referred to as the "Gillmor Property."
B.
adjacent
Utah,

Richards

to the Gillmor

described

reference

owns

made

Property

in Exhibit
a part

certain

real

in Summit

"B" attached

hereof,

which

property

located

County, State of

hereto

property

and by this

is hereinafter

referred to as the "Richards Property."
C.

Certain

existing,

unimproved

roadways

lie

upon

the Richards Property and the Gillmor Property commonly known
as the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road.

The parties

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

3C±

hereto desire hereby

to set forth

their

agreement

and under-

standing with respect to the improvement, use and maintenance
of

said

roads

to

the

mutual

benefit

of

their

respective

Properties.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration

of the mutual cove-

nants and agreements herein contained, and for other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are
hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Grant

of

Easements,

Gillmor XperpetuaiCeasements

Richards

hereby

grants-—bo-—^

(the "Easements^) over and

across

the Perdue Creek Road land the Neil Creek Road/ from the intersection
Weber

of

said

Canyon

roads with

Road)

over

State Highway

and

across

213

the

(known

Richards

as

the

Property

described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto to the east and south
boundaries

of

the Gillmor

Property

described

in

Exhibit

"A"

attached hereto,^ to have and to hold the same for the purposes
and subject to the conditions and limitations herein contained.
2.

Exclusive

Easements^

The

Easements

herein

granted *a-£-e exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit
of Richards, as grantor, Gillmor as grantee,.] and the officers, f* .^U
directors, Jinvitees,
Gillmor.

agents

and

employees/ of

Richards

and

Cillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not

use the Easements, or allow the Easements

to be used by his

invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause
the Easements
specifically

to become part

of

the public

domain.

Gillmor

covenants and agrees that he shall not allow the

txiA^^u ~ Li
Gillmor property to be used in such a manner so as

to subject

the Easements to demands by the public for access to any portion of the Gillmor

property.

Notwithstanding

the foregoing,

it is acknowledged by Richards that^one rrridmrr m^y—be
1

s4-«*et-ed-v-upon the Gillmor Property, and that

VI/OIT*

the occupant of

such r*ociaeiLpe shall have the right to use the Easements for
access to such ^e^opfoc^.
3.

Purposes

of

Easements,

The

Easements

herein

granted

are granted for the following purposes only and shall

not

enlarged

be

upon

without

the

prior

written

consent

Richards^, which, concent .shall H U L bb1 uni easuiidbl^1 wi Lhhil-4^->
(a)
egress) between
Road

213

and

Property.

CoaojaL

the

the

v_ehicular

intersection

east

and

access

(ingress

of the Easements with

south

boundaries

of

the

of
—~
and

State

Gillmor

Such access is hereby limited to access for mainte-

nance work performed on the Gillmor property (including maintenance of the Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek
Road and Neil Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property), for
**/}r\ yp^creatiorr^JTxrtr^Trall iTrclude-?—among Ottrer—Hrrfrr^rpi ^m'r^'n^
.vv;/\-camping,Lhunting, land f ishingXand for animal husbandry^and
CJ"" [^,

(b)

General access for animal husbandry, includ-

ing the herding of livestock, between the intersection of the
Easements

with

State Road

213

and

the east .^boundarlT of

the

Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not be
limited

to,

husbandry.
/

/

h^

equipment
x^

and

personnel

incident

to

animal

t

Limitations on Use of Neil Creek Road

Easeme

Notwithstanding the grant of easement over and across the Neil
Creek Road herein contained,J Gillmor hereby agrees not to use
the Neil Creek Road Easement exceptALn emergency situations or
at such times as the Perdue Creek Road is impassible./^
5.

Covenants

to Run

with

the

Land.

The

exclusive

nature of the Easements herein granted and the limitations on
use herein contained are declared by the parties hereto to be
covenants and restrictions which
to

the

Gillmor

described, and
benefit

of

Property

and

the

shall be binding

all

present

and

run with and are appurtenant
Richards

upon

future

and

Property,

shall

owners

inure

and/or

herein
to the

purchasers,

occupants and lessees of said Properties.
6.

Improvement

of Perdue Creek

Road Easement. —The,

parties hereto recognize that cer taij^impTovements
sary to the -Perdue Creek Road
the purposes

herein

set

are neces-

to make such road suitable for

forth. A ^Gillmor

and

Richards

.

hereby

agree to establish an escrow account for the purpose of funding
said

improvements.

Upon

execution

of

this Agreement, or

as

soon thereafter as practicable,%the parties shall establish an
escrow

account

at Continental

Bank .and Trust

Co., and • shall

each contribute the sum of $5,000 to said account.

}

held in such account, including
shall be used
Creek

Road

Highway 213 and

the

intersection

the east and

All funds

interest earned on said funds,

solely for the purpose of

between

j

of

improving N the Perdue
said

Road^tb

south boundar ies/of

State

1

the GiXlmor

if
^J*K^

Ttftftw

property.

All

of

(l"j y e a r , from

the

responsible

for

Road

he

which

desirable

in

the

the

event

$10,000,

improvements

date

of

making
deems,

cost

in

If

be

Agreement.

his

made

the^lTses

shall

to

account

the cost

of

be

on

the

first

improvements

Creek
or

herein.

In

is

in

be

necessary

authorized

equally

one

shall

the ^Befciue

improvements

share

within

Gillmor

discretion^^lfo

jnakiTng such

escrow

this Agreement.

shall

improvements

with

of

parties

in^*the

this

such

connection

the

remaining

said

less

all

than

amounts

anniversary

of

exceeds $10,000,

Gillmor shall be solely responsible to pay such excess amounts. /
7.

Maintenance

of

Easements .

Thie —p-a-r-t-ies-~-a-ekxi.ow 1 -

^Jige^th-a-tr^ttre- -pe-r-io d i-c- m a in.te.nance- of -1he ~P"eT*aue~~Cf eeX"Roa~d^arTa
U-e^rl—6^-eek
&ei

t
lie
th£

RJO^—Lw±l1

b-e—n ex: e s s axy_

Gillmor

-&h

KY }^***^*)fi%~*'

f^egpOTfsiLle lur\

m a i n t a i n i n g — the Perdue Creek Road Easementrja-irek

Richards

be

shall

responsible

for

maintaining

the Neil

Gr^ek

RjD^d Easement, R R i c h a r d s agrees to pay
"^^--..._^l—

to Gillmor th.a-fjzfortion
,.....- -" /"'

of

sells-'during, "each

each

which

hunting^pe~oiit

is

designated

which

for

road

Richards

maintenance

and

amount shall not be less than $20 per permit

repair,

and which

year
which

amount

shall be used by Gillmor strictly for repair and maintenance of
the

Perdue

Cceek

Richards/each

year

Road.
that

Gillmor-" agrees
the" amount

to

paid

to

provide
him

by

proof

to

Richards

hereunder shall have been expended by Gillmor

for such mainte-

,i£]

proof

nance and

repair\'£nd Richards agrees to provide Gillmor

of the number^'of hunting permits sold by hi
yjx"

8.

Designation

of

Use

of

Easements

by

Invitees.

Gil'lmor agrees that he shall not allow more t^n 7 )25/persons
-/

Vl ^/l/l*^

and

xiL}faa,«tt>"&

W ^

&

v

/••••*

*.

$w..&^.$f*

l<<jiv\AflAt0
>/ityte>

•4*-

^ehicles to use the Easements Ifxx-r—r-e-e-r«ea-t4-4B-a4—pru-r-ptrs^s^
"eft any time^^JGi2rlmor~- furt'her.. agrees that he,.- shall provid e- to
Richards a list of pej^so'ns whom he ^w-rll allow t o ^ s e the Ease
merits-- during

each year./ Gillmor

further

agrees that he will

:equire each vehicle using the Easements to carry and to display on its windshield
use

the

hunting

4

Easements.

identification as a vehicle allowed to

Gillmor

further

season he will, require each

agrees

that

invitee

during

to maintain

the
some

mark of identification to be displayed during the time that he
uses the Easements. I Richards agrees that he will provide to
Gillmor a list of persons who will use the Easements for hunt^
ing purposes during' the hunting season each year, and Richards
-agrees that he,-Will require each person obtaining frotff Richards
a hunting permit or hunting on Richards1 property adjacent to
Gillmor1s

property

identification

with

permission

to

carry

some

mark

of

as su chT) Gill mor

so that he can be identified

agrees that he will not allow use of and will not himself use
any

three-wheeled

two-wheeled

motorized

motorcycles

Easements at any

or

All

Terrain

motorized

Vehicles

"dirt

bikes"

or

any

on

the

time^. I andK Richards ^agrees ^that he will no

allows use of such vehicles ,oh the.'Terdue Creek Road .1

E
9.

indemnification.

Each^party agrees to indemnify,

defend and hold the other harmless from and against any and all
costs, losses, liabilities,/causes of actions, claims, demands,
/

damages

and

incurred

by

fees,

including

either ,-party

/

^ry

as

reasonable
a

result

of

attorneys1
the

fees,

negligence

or

willful

misconduct

in the use, improvement

the Easements by either party hereto.
10.

Entire Agreement.

or maintenance of

j

This Agreement constitutes the

entire agreement of the parties hereto relating to the subject
matter hereof, and shall not be modified or amended except by
written instrument executed by both parties hereto.
11.

Binding Agreement.

This Agreement shall be bind-

ing upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto,
their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees, heirs,
personal representatives, successors and assigns.
12.

Default.

The rights and interest granted herein,

an the limitations, covenants and conditions herein contained,
are unique.

The parties therefore agree that in the event of

default hereunder by either party, the following remedies shall
be available to the aggreived party:
(a)

An

action

for

specific

performance

under

this Agreement;
(b)

An action for damages incurred as a result

of such default; and
(c)

Any other rights or remedies provided by law

or in equity.
13.

Notices.

Any notices required or permitted here-

under shall be deemed duly delivered when delivered personally
or

when

mailed

in

the

United

States

Mail, postage

prepaid,

certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, and
addressed to the respective addresses for the parties set forth
in the first paragraph of this Agreement.

14.
entered

into

Governing
in

the

Law.

This

State of

Utah

Agreement

and

shall

is

be

made

construed

and
and

interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
IN WITNESS
or

have

caused

WHEREOF,

the

these presents

parties

hereto

to be executed

by

have
the

executed
duly

and

authorized officers the day and year first above written.

CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR.

DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC,

By:
DAVID K. RICHARDS
President

STATE OF UTAH
ss .
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
day of November, 1985, personally
appeared
On the
before me Charles F. Gillmor, J r . , the signer of the within and
foregoing
instrument who duly acknowledged
to me that he
executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

-8-

STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the
day of November, 1985, personally appeared
before me David K. Richards, who, being by me duly sworn, did
say that he is the President
of David K. Richards & Company,
Inc., a Utah corporation, and that said within and foregoing
instrument was executed by authority of its By-laws or the
Resolution of the Board of Directors of said corporation and
said David K. Richards acknowledged to me that said corporation
executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires;

1375J
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EXHIBIT "A"
GILLMOR PROPERTY
Real Property located in Summit County,
State of Utah, and described as follows:
All of Sections 26 and 25, the south 637.33 acres
of Section 23 and the south 318.67 acres of the
west half of Section 24 and the east 98.2 acres
of Section34, TIN, R6E, SLB&M. Contains 2306.53
acres.

EXHIBIT "B"
RICHARDS PROPERTY
Real Property located in Summit County,
State of Utah, and described as follows:
Township
Meridian

1

Section 2:
Township
Meridian

1

South,

Range

6

East,

All (Containing
less)
North,

Range

6

Salt

608.45

East,

Lake

Base

acres, more

Salt

Lake

Base

&
or
&

Section 25:

All (Containing
less)

641.48

acres, more

or

Section 36:

All (Containing
less)

598.60

acres, more

or

Township
Meridian

1

Section 30:

North,

Range

7

East,

Salt

Lake

Base

&

All (except the East 156.05 acres, more
or
less,
thereof,
particularly
described as follows, to wit:)
Beginning at the Northeast corner of
said Section 30, Township 1 North,
Range 7 East, SLB&M, and running thence
South 5280 feet, more or less, to the
South boundary line of said Section 30;
thence West 1287.41 feet; thence North
5280 feet, more or less, to the North
boundary
line
of
said
Section 30;
thence East 1287.41 feet, more or less,
to the place of beginning.
(Containing
156.05 acres, more or less)

Section 31:

Nl/2; N1/2SW1/4; and that portion of
the S1/2SW1/4 and that portion of the
SEl/4
lying
North
of
the
South
right-of-way
boundary
line
of Utah
State
Highway
No.
213.
Containing
559.89 acres, more or less)

Township
Ner idian

1

Section 24:

Township
Mer idian

1

Section 19:

North,

Range

6 East,

Salt

Lake

Pase

&

The El/2 (W1/2E1/2 and all of Lots 1,
2, 3 and 4) (Containing 321.12 acres,
more or less)
North,

Range

7

East,

Salt

Lake

Base

&

The Wl/2 (E1/2W1/2 and all of lots 1,
2, 3 and 4) except the East 396 feet of
said
one-half
section
(Containing
270.06 acres, more or less)

AFTER RECORDING PLEASE
MAIL TO:
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr
P. 0. Box 130
Oakley, Utah 84055
EASEMENT AND USE AGREEMENT
This Easement and Use Agreement ("Agreement") is made
and entered into this

day of

, 1985, by

and between CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR., an individual ("Gillmor"),
whose

address

DAVID K.

is P. 0. Box

RICHARDS

&

130, Oakley, Utah

COMPANY,

INC.,

a, Utah

84055, and
corporation

("Richards"), with its principal place of business at 303 North
2370 West, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah

84116.

RECITALS:
A.

Gillmor

owns

certain

real

property

located

in

Summit County, State of Utah, described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, hereinafter
referred to as the "Gillmor Property."
B.

Richards

owns

certain

real

property

located

adjacent to the Gillmor Property in Summit County, State of
Utah, described

in Exhibit

"B" attached hereto and by this

reference made a part hereof, which property

is hereinafter

referred to as the "Richards Property."
C.

Certain

existing, unimproved

roadways

lie upon

the Richards Property and the Gillmor Property commonly known
as the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road.

The parties

hereto desire hereby to set forth their agreement and understanding with respect to the improvement, use and maintenance
of

said

roads

to

the

mutual

benefit

of

their

respective

Properties,
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements herein contained, and for other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are
hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Grant of Easements,

Richards hereby grants to

Gillm<>r'^MHflflHK easement* (the "Easementji"1) over and across
the Perdue Creek Road

flMfeJHflHIIHBIIHBHHV

from the inter-

section of said roads with State Highway 213 (known as the
Weber

Canyon

Road)

over

and

across

the

Richards

Property

described in Exhibit "Bn attached hereto to the east and south
boundaries of the Gillmor Property described

in Exhibit "A"

attached hereto, to have and to hold the same for the purposes
and subject to the conditions and limitations herein contained*
2.

Exclusive

Easements.

The

Easements

herein

granted are exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit
of Richards, as grantor, Gillmor as grantee,/^!

Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not
use yZhe

Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his

invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause
the Easements to become part of the public domain.

Gillmor

specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not allow the

-2-

egress) between the intersection of the Easements with State
Road 213 and
Property.

the east and south boundaries of the Gillmor

Such access is hereby limited to access for mainte-

nance work performed on the Gillmor property (including maintenance of the Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek
Road and Neil Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property) f JBfe r

Easements with State Road 213 and the east/\boundary of the
Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not be
limited

to,

equipment

and

personnel

husbandry.
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incident

to

animal

4.

Limitations

on Use of N e i l

Creek Road

i&asemei
t

the Neil Creek Road

5.

Gilimor hereby agrees not to use
except

Covenants to Run with the Land,

The exclusive

nature of the Easements herein granted and the limitations on
use herein contained are declared by the parties hereto to be
H.covenants and restrictions which run with and are appurtenant
iu /to the Gilimor
f\m/

Property

and

the Richards

Property,

herein

described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the
benefit of all present and future owners and/or purchasers,
occupants and lessees of said Properties.
6.

Improvement of Perdue Creek Road Easement,

The'

parties hereto recognize that certain* improvements are necessary to the Perdue Creek Road to make such road suitable for
the purposes herein set forth,

fighw

^±^^*^—^^

east and south boundj

• ^

J^

J-/-

</W^*'

_

4

Jf'

.nt..- ?*,*?/

7. Maintenance of Easements, The parties acknowledge that the periodic
maintenance of the Perdue Cr&ek Roa
will
^ 5 ® ^

e

8

be

necessary.

Gillmor

ni^-g- the
thtf Perdue CCreek Pn.H
& * maintain!^

*

£-eslffnati0"

"f

^e

of

P, gom . nts

bv

shall

P a

be

;-^

TmHt.0fta

Gillmor agrees that he shall not allow more than "~
I persons and
-5-

vehicles to use the Easementsi
at any time*

Gillmor further agrees that"" Tie shall provide to

Richards a list of persons whom he will allow to use the Easements during each year,

Gillmor further agrees that he will

require each vehicle using the Easements to carry and to display on its windshield identification as a vehicle allowed to
use the Easements.

Gillmor

further

agrees that during

the

hunting season he will require each invitee to maintain some
mark of identification to be displayed during the time that he
uses the Easements.

5eTtr ^^•M^eriffiWP
Gillmor
agrees that he will not allow use of and will not himself use
any

three-wheeled

two-wheeled

motorized

motorcycles

Easements at any time,

or

All

Terrain

motorized

Vehicles

"dirt

bikes"

or

any

on

the

1CL

Entire Agreement,

This Agreement constitutes the

entire agreement of the parties hereto relating to the subject
matter hereof, and shall not be modified or amended except by
written instrument executed by both parties hereto.
11.

Binding Agreement,

This Agreement shall be bind-

ing upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto,
their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees, heirs,
personal representatives, successors and assigns,
12.

Default,

The rights and interest granted herein,

an the limitations, covenants and conditions herein contained,
are unique.

The parties therefore agree that in the event of

default hereunder by either party, the following remedies shall
be available to the aggreived party:
(a) An

action

for

specific

performance

under

this Agreement;
(b) An action for damages incurred as a result
of such default; and
(c) Any other rights or remedies provided by law
or in equity.
13.

Notices,

Any notices required or permitted here-

under shall be deemed duly delivered when delivered personally
or when mailed

in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,

certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, and
addressed to the respective addresses for the parties set forth
in the first paragraph of this Agreement.
-7-

14,

Governing

Law,

This

Agreement

is

made

and

entered into in the State of Utah and shall be construed and
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah,
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
or have caused these presents to be executed by the duly and
authorized officers the day and year first above written.

CHARLES P. GILLMOR, JR.
DAVID K, RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC.

By:_
DAVID K. RICHARDS
President

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

On the
day of November, 1985, personally appeared
before me Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., the signer of the within and
foregoing
instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:_
My Commission Expires:

-8-

STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the
day of November, 1985, personally appeared
before me David K. Richards, who, being by me duly sworn, did
say that he is the President of David K. Richards & Company,
Inc., a Utah corporation, and that said within and foregoing
instrument was executed by authority of its By-laws or the
Resolution of the Board of Directors of said corporation and
said David K. Richards acknowledged to me that said corporation
executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:_
My Commission Expires:
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EXHIBIT "A"
GILLMOR PROPERTY
Real Property located in Summit County,
State of Utah, and described as follows:

n

All of Sections 26 and/25/ the south 637.33 acres
of Section 23 and the^south 318.67 acres of the
west half of Section 24 and the east 98.2 acres
of Section34, TIN, R6E, SLB&M. Contains 2306,53
acres.

EXHIBIT "B"
RICHARDS PROPERTY
Real Property located in Summit County,
State of Utah, and described as follows:
Township
Meridian

1 South, Range

Section 2:
Township
Meridian

6 East, Salt

Lake

Base &

All (Containing 608.45 acres, more or
less)

1 North, Range

6 East, Salt

Lake Base &

Section 25:

All (Containing 641.48 acres, more or
less)

Section 36:

All (Containing 598.60 acres, more or
less)

Township
Meridian

1 North, Range 7 East, Salt

Section 30:

Lake

Base &

All (except the East 156.05 acres, more
or
less,
thereof,
particularly
described as follows, to wit:)
Beginning at the Northeast corner of
said Section 30, Township 1 North,
Range 7 East, SLB&M, and running thence
South 5280 feet, more or less, to the
South boundary line of said Section 30;
thence West 1287.41 feet; thence North
5280 feet, more or less, to the North
boundary line of said Section 30;
thence East 1287.41 feet, more or less,
to the place of beginning. (Containing
156.05 acres, more or less)

Section 31:

Nl/2; N1/2SW1/4; and that portion of
the S1/2SW1/4 and that portion of the
SEl/4
lying
North
of
the
South
right-of-way boundary line of Utah
State Highway No. 213.
Containing
559.89 acres, more or less)

Township
Meridian

1 North, Range

Section 24:

Township
Meridian

Lake

Base

&

The El/2 (W1/2E1/2 and all of Lots 1 #
2, 3 and 4) (Containing 321.12 acres,
more or less)

1 North, Range

Section 19:

6 East, Salt

7 East, Salt

Lake

Base

&

The Wl/2 (E1/2W1/2 and all of lots 1,
2, 3 and 4) except the East 396 feet of
said
one-half
section
(Containing
270.06 acres, more or less)

AFTER RECORDING PLEASE
MAIL TO:

H~2-0-K~

Charles F. Gillmor, Jr.
P. 0. Box 130
Oakley, Utah 84055
EASEMENT AND USE AGREEMENT
This Easement and Use Agreement ("Agreement") is made
and entered into this

day of November, 19 85, by and

between CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR., an individual
whose

address

DAVID K.

("Gillmor"),

is P. 0. Box 130, Oakley, Utah

RICHARDS

&

COMPANY,

INC,

a

Utah

84055, and
corporation

("Richards"), with its principal place of business at 303 North
2370 West, Suite 200, Salt Lake City,- Utah

84116.

RECITALS:
A.

Gillmor

owns

certain

real property

located in

Summit County, State of Utah, described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, hereinafter
referred to as the "Gillmor Property,"
B.

Richards

owns

certain

real

property

located

adjacent to the Gillmor Property in Summit County, State of
Utah, described

in Exhibit

"B" attached hereto and by this

reference made a part hereof, which property is hereinafter
referred to as the "Richards Property."
C.

Certain

existing, unimproved

roadways

lie upon

the Richards Property and the Gillmor Property commonly known
as the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road.

The parties

hereto

desire

hereby

to set

forth their agreement and under-

standing with respect to the improvement, use
of

said

roads

to

the

mutual

benefit

of

and

maintenance

their

respective

Properties.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements herein contained, and for other good and
valuable

consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are

hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Grant

of

Easements,

Gillmor perpetual Easements

(the

Richards

hereby

"Easements") over

grants
and

to

across

the Perdue Creek Road and over and across the Neil Creek Road
from

the

intersection

of

said

roads

with

State

Highway

213

(known as the Weber Canyon Road) over and across the Richards
Property described
and

south

in Exhibit

boundaries

of

"B" attached hereto to the east

the

Gillmor

Property

described

in

Exhibit "A" attached hereto, to have and to hold the same for
the

purposes

and

subject

to

the

conditions

and

limitations

herein contained.
2.

Exclusive

easements.

Except as hereinafter pro-

vided, the Easements herein granted are exclusive as to use and
inure only to the benefit of Richards, as grantor, and Gillmor
as grantee.

Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall

not use the Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his
invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause
the

Easements

to

become part

of the public domain.

Gillmor

specifically covenants and agiees that he shall not allow the

-2-

Gillmor property to be used in such a manner so as to subject
the Easements to demands by the public for access to any portion of the Gillmor property.

Notwithstanding the foregoing,

it is acknowledged by Richards that there is one cabin on the
Gillmor

Property, and that the occupant of such cabin shall

have the right to use the Easements for access to such cabin.
3.

Purposes

of

Easements.

The

Easements

herein

granted are granted for the following purposes only and shall
not

be

enlarged

upon without

the prior written consent of

Richards.
(a) Vehicular

access

(ingress

and

egress)

between the intersection of the Perdue Creek Road with State
Road 213 and over and across that portion of the Neil Creek
Road from the point in Section 30, Range 7 East, Township 1
North where it is joined by the Perdue Creek Road and as it
continues in a northerly direction through Section 25, Range 6
East, Township 1 North into Section 24, Range 6 East, Township
1 North, and the east and south boundaries of
Property.

the Gillmor

Such access is hereby limited to access for mainte-

nance work performed on the Gillmor property (including maintenance of the Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek
Road and Neil Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property), for
access by Gillmor and his immediate family to the first degree
of consanguinty, and their spouses and children, to the Gillmor
property, and for animal husbandry; and

(b)

General access for animal husbandry, includ-

ing the herding of livestock, between the intersection of the
Perdue Creek Road with State Road 213 and over and across the
Neil Creek Road

from the point

in Section 30, Range 7 East,

Township 1 North where it is joined by the Perdue Creek Road
and

as

it continues

in a northerly direction through Section

25, Range 6 East, Township
East, Township

1 North

into Section

24, Range 6

1 North, and the east and south boundaries of

the Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not
be limited to, equipment and personnel incident to animal husbandry; and
(c)

For

vehicular

between the intersection of

access

(ingress

and

egress)

the Perdue Creek Road with

State

Road 213 and over and across the Neil Creek Road from the point
in Section

25, Range

joined

the

by

Perdue

6 East, Township
Creek

Road

and

1 North
as

it

where

it

continues

is

in a

northerly direction into Section 24, Range 6 East, Township 1
North,

and

the

east

and

south

Property for Gillmor's invitees.

boundaries

of

the

Gillmor

Such access is hereby limited

to access for maintenance work performed on the Gillmor Property

(including maintenance

of

the Easements

and

those por-

tions of the Perdue Creek road and Neil Creek road lying upon
the Gillmor property) and for hunting; and
(d)

Vehicular

animal husbandry,

including

access

and

the herding

general
of

access

livestock,

for

across

the Neil Creek Road from the point where it is joined by the

Perdue Creek Road

in Section 30, Range 7 East, Township 1

North, southward to its intersection with State Highway 213 for
use in emergency

situations only or with the permission of

Richards.
4.

Covenants to Run with the Land.

The exclusive

nature of the Easements herein granted and the limitations on
use herein contained are declared by the parties hereto to be
covenants and restrictions which run with and are appurtenant
to

the

Gillmor

Property

and

the Richards

Property,

herein

described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the
benefit of all present

and

future owners and/or purchasers,

occupants and lessees of said Properties.
5. Maintenance of Easements.

Gillmor shall have the

right to maintain the Easements as necessary.

Gillmor agrees

to give Richards notice prior to undertaking

any major con-

struction, other than routine maintenance, on the Easements.
6.

Designation

of

Use

of

Easements

by

Invitees.

Gillmor agrees that he shall not allow more than 15 persons and
five vehicles to use the Easements for hunting purposes at any
time.

Gillmor agrees that he will require each vehicle using

the Easements for hunting purposes to carry and to display on
its windshield identification as a vehicle allowed to use the
Easements.

Gillmor agrees that he will not allow use of and

will not himself use any three-wheeled motorized All Terrain
Vehicles

or

any

two-wheeled

motorcycles

bikes" on the Easements at any time.

or motorized

"dirt

7.

Entire Agreement.

This Agreement constitutes the

entire agreement of the parties hereto relating to the subject
matter hereof, and shall not be modified or amended except by
written instrument executed by both parties hereto.
8.

Binding Agreement.

This Agreement shall be bind-

ing upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto,
their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees, heirs,
personal

representatives,

successors,

assigns,

owners, occu-

pants and lessees of the subject properties.
9.

Default.

The rights and interest granted herein,

and the limitations, covenants and conditions herein contained,
are unique.

The parties therefore agree that in the event of

default hereunder by either party, the following remedies shall
be available to the aggrieved party:
(a)

An

action

for

specific

performance

under

this Agreement;
(b)

An action for damages

incurred

as a result

of such default; and
(c)

Any other rights or remedies provided by law

or in equity.
10.

Notices.

Any notices required or permitted here-

under shall be deemed duly delivered when delivered personally
or when

mailed

in

the

United

States

Mail,

postage

prepaid,

certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, and
addressed to the respective addresses for the parties set forth
in the first paragraph of this Agreement.
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11.

Governing

Law.

This

Agreement

is

made

and

entered into in the State of Utah and shall be construed and
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
or have caused these presents to be executed by the duly and
authorized officers the day and year first above written.

CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR.
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC.

By:
DAVID K. RICHARDS
President

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

On the
day of November, 1985, personally appeared
before me Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., the signer of the within and
foregoing
instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:__
My Commission Expires:

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss

On the
day of November, 1985, personally appeared
before me David K. Richards, who, being by me duly sworn, did
say that he is the President
of David K. Richards & Company,
Inc., a Utah corporation, and that said within and foregoing
instrument was executed by authority of its By-laws or the
Resolution of the Board of Directors of said corporation and
said David K. Richards acknowledged to me that said corporation
executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

1375J
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EXHIBIT "A
GILLMOR PROPERTY
Real Property located in Summit County,
State of Utah, and described as follows:
All of Sections 26 and 35, the south 637.33 acres
of Section 23 and the south 318.67 acres of the
west half of Section 24 and the east 98.2 acres
of Section34, TIN, R6E, SLBScM. Contains 2306.53
acres.

-9-

EXHIBIT "B"
RICHARDS PROPERTY
Real Property located in Summit County,
State of Utah, and described as follows:
Township
Meridian

1

Section 2:
Township
Meridian

1

South,

Range

6

East,

All (Containing
less)
North,

Range

6

Salt

608.45

East,

Lake

Base

acres, more

Salt

Lake

Base

&
or
&

Section 25:

All (Containing
less)

641.48

acres, more

Section 36:

All (Containing
less)

598.60

acres, more or

Township
Meridian

1 North,

Section 30:

Range

7

East,

Salt

Lake

Base

or

k

All (except the East 156.05 acres, more
or
less,
thereof,
particularly
described as follows, to wit:)
Beginning at the Northeast corner of
said Section 30, Township
1 North,
Range 7 East, SLBStM, and running thence
South 5280 feet, more or less, to the
South boundary line of said Section 30;
thence West 1287.41 feet; thence North
5280 feet, more or less, to the North
boundary
line of said
Section
30;
thence East 1287.41 feet, more or less,
to the place of beginning.
(Containing
156.05 acres, more or less)

Section 31:

Nl/2; N1/2SW1/4; and that portion of
the S1/2SW1/4 and that portion of the
SE1/4 lying North of the South rightof-way boundary line of Utah
State
Highway No. 213.
Containing 559.89
acres, more or less)

-10-

Township
Meridian

1 North, Range

Section 24:

Township
Meridian

Lake

Base

&

The El/2 (W1/2E1/2 and all of Lots 1,
2, 3 and 4) (Containing 321.12 acres,
more or less)

1 North, Range

Section 19:

6 East, Salt

7 East, Salt Lake Base &

The Wl/2 (E1/2W1/2 and all of lots 1,
2, 3 and 4) except the East 396 feet of
said
one-half
section
(Containing
270.06 acres, more or less)
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EASEMENT AGREEMENT \ 2

Exclusive

Easements.

The

Easements

herein

2

ited are exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit

invitees,

agents

and

employees

of

Richards

Exclusive

Easements.

of Richards, as grantor, Gillmor

The

Basements

2.

herein

as grantee.

S

the Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his
tees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause

Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not
Easements, or allow

invitees, agents or employees

Gillmor

the Easements

:if ically covenants and agrees that he shall not 4e*el*f>- the

to become

part

the Easements

to be

in such a manner
of

the public

Exclusive

easements.

Except as hereinafter

pro-

vided, the Easements herein granted are exclusive as to use and
inure only to the benefit of Richards, as grantor, and Gillmor

as grantee,jg

and

imor. Gil loot hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not

Easements to become part of the public domain.

-

granted are exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit

Uchards, as grantor, Gillmor as grantee, and the officers,
tctors,

Final
11/21/85

Workman Edit
11/15/85

Elegante's First Draft
11/01/85
2.

TRIAL EXHIBIT 1

TRIAL EXHIBIT 332

TRIAL EXHIBIT 304

used by

his

so as to cause
domain.

Gillmor

Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees

that

he shall

not use the Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his
invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause
the

Easements

to

become part

of the public domain.

Gillmor

specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not allow

the

specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not allow the

AM.***)

PBL000023

Gillmor property to be used in such a manner so as to subject

^*

to Vc- M^c,/
the Easements to demands by the public for access to any por-

11 linor property'in such a manner so as to subject the Ease-

Gillmor property to be used in such a manner BO as to subject

tion of the Gillmor property.

Notwithstanding the foregoing,

the Basenents to demands by the public for access to any porit is acknowledged by Richards that there is one cabin on the

snts to demands by the public for access to any portion of the
tion of the Gilioor property.
11Imor

property.

Notwithstanding

the

foregoing.

it

is

:k.nowledged by Richards that one residence may be constructed
>on

the

Gillmor

Property,

and

that

the

occupant

of

such

tsidance shall have the tight to use the Easements for access
3 such residence.

Gillmor

Property,

and

that the occupant of such cabin shall

have the right to use the Easements for access to such cabin.

EASEMENT AGREEMENT J 3
TRIAL EXHIBIT 304

TRIAL EXHIBIT 332

TRIAL EXHIBIT 1

Elegante's First Draft
11/01/85

Workman Edit
11/15/85

Final
11/21/85

3

3.
nted
be

Purposes—ft£—EJLSfimtHfc*.

are granted
enlarged

The

Easements

herein

for the following purposes only and shall

upon

without

the

prior

written

consent

hards, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.

of

*

Purposes

granted

are granted

not

enlarged

be

Richards;,

r."

of

Basements.

The

Basements

herein

for the following purposes only and shall

upon

without

the

prior

written

consent

W

of

3.

Purposes

of

Easements.

The

Easements

herein

granted are granted for the following purposes only and shall
not

be

enlarged

Richards.

upon

without

the

prior written

consent of

EASEMENT AGREEMENT f 3a

Workman Edit
11/15/85

Elegante's First Draft
11/01/85
(a)

(a) General

vehicular

access

(ingress

egress) between the intersection of the Easements with State
Road 213 and the east boundary of the Gillmor Property.

Such

Road

access

work

Property.

hereby

limited

to

access

for

maintenance

saasaWEgBaf

and
egress) between

is

TRIAL EXHIBIT 1

TRIAL EXHIBIT 332

TRIAL EXHIBIT 304

performed on the Gillmor property (including maintenance of the
Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek Road and Meil
Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property), for recreation

213

and

the

the

vehicular

intersection

eecc

and

accents

of

south

Final
11/21/85
(ingress

the Basements

boundaries

of

with
the

(a)

and
State

Cillmor

Such access io U-ioby limited to acceii* for mainte-

Road

213 and over and

Road from the point
North where

nance of the Easement* and

General access for animal husbandry,

ing the herding of livestock, between
Easements

limited

Gillmor Property, which access shall

and

personnel

incident

to

animal

husbandry.

30, Range

7 East, Township 1

by thr> Perdue Creek Road and

as it

limited

with

to,

and

the east

and

south

boundaries

of

the

Gillmor

Such access is hereby limited to access for mainte-

nance work performed on the Gillmor property (including mainte(b)

Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not be
equipment

in Section

State

portion of the Meil Creek

those portions of the Perdue Creek

aHBHmaaas^^

ing the hetdi»9 ©*• iiv«»cocK. insiweeii tiie intersection or tne

to.

that

egress)

with

lying upon the Gillmor Propyl ty), JtaT
1 North,

the east boundary of the

and

East. Township 1 North into Section 24, Range 6 East, Township
Road^ and Meil Cteejk. Road

Property.

and

across

is joined

(ingress

continues in a northerly direction through Section 25. Range 6

hunting, and fishing, and for animal husbandry; and

Easements with State Road 213

it

access

the Perdue Creek Road

nance work performed on the Cillmor property (including mainte-

which shall include, among other things, picnicking, camping,

(b) General access for animal husbandry, includ-

Vehicular

between the intersection of

State

Road

equipment

213

and

and

the intersection

the

oast

boundary

includof the
of

the

include, but shall not be

personnel

incident

to

animal

nance of the Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek
Road and Neil Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property), for
access by Gillmor and his immediate family to the first degree
of consanguinty, and their spouses and children, to the Gillmo
property, and for animal husbandry; and

husbandry.
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EASEMENT AGREEMENT
Designation of Use of Easements by Invitees
TRIAL EXHIBIT 1

TRIAL EXHIBIT 332

Final
11/21/85

Workman Edit
11/15/85
8.

Designation

of

Use

of

Easements

by

Invitees.

6.
Gillmor agrees that he shall not allow more than 0f

Des.ignaJtii2n__ot.__Uae

ai toseinejifcs—by.—Lavi-t£e_s• . jrr~ JL

persons and
Gillmor agrees that he shall not allow more than 4-9 persons and^./^/fl
vehicles to use the Easements for hunting purposes at any

-5time.

Gillmor agrees that he will require each vehicle using

the Easements Cor hunting purposes to carry and to display on
Its windshield identification as a vehicle allowed to use the
Easements.
vehicles

Gillmor agrees that he will not allow use of and

to use the Easements/
will not himself use any thre»»-wheeled motorized

at any time.

Gillmor

further

agrees

that he shall provide

Vehicles
Richards a list of persons whom he will allow to use the Basements during

each

year.

Gillmor

further

require each vehicle using the Easements
play on
use

the

hunting

„'.•'*:<

its windshield
Easements.
season

identification

Gillmor

he will

mark of identification

each

that

to carry and

he

will

to dis-

as a vehicle allowed

further

require

agrees

agrees

that

invitee

during

to maintain

to
the

some

to b<* displayed during the time that he

uses the Easements.

11

agrees that he will not allow use of and will not himself use
any

three-wheeled

two-wheeled

.«*'

motorized

motorcycles

or

All

Terrain

motorized

Vehicles

"dirt

bikes"

All Terrain

to

or

any

on

the

or

any

two-wheeled

motorcycles

bikes" on the Easements at any time.

or

motorized
^,^

"dirt
„^_

w 3B2rv.:33

